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WHO’S AFRAID OF UBER? 
Jeremy Kidd, J.D., Ph.D.* 
Ride-sharing has disrupted the transportation-for-hire industry, breaking 
down barriers to entry that have protected entrenched incumbents for decades. 
The disruption has led to calls for increased regulation, along with criticisms 
about the effect of innovation on consumer safety, market stability, rule of law, 
and other areas. That disruption, however, has also led to tremendous benefits to 
consumers as they are freed from a regulatory regime that limited their transpor-
tation choices and forced them to pay higher prices for lower quality service. The 
same type of disruptive innovation is upon us in almost every area of our econo-
my. How we deal with it will determine whether the law will finally free consum-
ers from the grasp of entrenched and privileged incumbents or whether the com-
bined forces of those incumbents and their erstwhile allies in academia will lead 
to a regulatory retrenchment. The Article concludes that opposition to innovation 
rests on a Galbraithian foundation that holds a dim view of human nature. 
Greater reliance on Smithian assumptions would serve us better as we decide 
how to deal with innovation and its disruption. The Article also concludes that 
innovation is inevitable; if the law seeks to inhibit it, it merely guarantees a 
greater disruption when it finally arrives. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................  582 
 I. A TALE OF TRANSPORTATION MARKETS ............................................  584 
 A. The Economics of Transportation ...............................................  584 
 1. Supply and Demand ..............................................................  584 
 2. Market Perfection and Imperfection .....................................  589 
 B. Evolution of the Modern Taxi .....................................................  591 
 C. Correcting Externalities ..............................................................  593 
 D. Transaction Costs .......................................................................  596 
 II. A SOLUTION, BUT AT WHAT COST? ....................................................  598 
 III. OF GALBRAITHIAN BAPTISTS AND TULLOCKIAN BOOTLEGGERS .......  602 
 A. Bootleggers and Baptists Basics .................................................  606 
 B. Bootleggers and Transitional Gains ...........................................  609 
 1. Taxi Drivers ..........................................................................  611 
 2. Taxi Companies ....................................................................  613 
 3. Taxi Commissions .................................................................  614 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. Many thanks to helpful 
comments by Rory Van Loo, John Cameron Kidd, and two anonymous reviewers of a previ-
ous draft. All remaining errors are mine. 
20 NEV. L.J. 581 
582 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:2  
 4. Financial Institutions ............................................................  616 
 5. A Word on Transitional Gains ..............................................  619 
 C. Academic Baptists? .....................................................................  622 
 1. Benefits of Ride-Sharing .......................................................  623 
 2. What About the Costs? ..........................................................  627 
 a. TNCs and Riders .............................................................  628 
 b. TNCs and Drivers ...........................................................  632 
 c. TNCs and Society ............................................................  633 
 i. Regulatory Avoidance ................................................  634 
 ii. Information Asymmetries ...........................................  637 
 3. Will Regulation Help? ..........................................................  643 
 IV. INNOVATION UBER ALLEGORY ...........................................................  644 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................  649 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 14, 2018, the New York City Council froze all new for-hire-
vehicle licensing for one year.1 Given that the number of taxi licenses, or me-
dallions, is already fixed, the practical effect of the law is to freeze the ability 
of ride-sharing companies—also known as Transportation Network Companies, 
or TNCs—to expand in the city. A cursory glance past the accepted rationale of 
the ordinance—to provide “breathing room” to investigate the impact that for-
hire vehicles have on the city2—reveals little more than legislative power being 
wielded for the benefit of the powerful taxi industry. Having enjoyed strong le-
gal protections for almost a century, the combined taxi cartel now finds itself 
ceding market power to TNCs, and it is flexing its muscles to protect its privi-
leges. 
Legal barriers similar to those protecting taxis from competition exist in 
many areas of the economy, but wave after wave of innovation has begun to 
erode the legislative and regulatory walls that allow favored incumbents to 
wield monopoly power. Legal scholarship has begun to grapple with regula-
tion-innovation conflict in the financial sphere3 but has not yet applied the same 
focused lens on other areas in the economy. To be certain, some commentators 
 
1  N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 147 (Aug. 14, 2018). 
2  E.g., Deepti Hajela & Karen Matthews, NYC Considers One-Year Cap on Licenses for 
New Ride-Hail Cars, MEETINGS & CONVENTIONS (Aug. 8, 2018), http://www.meetings-con 
ventions.com/News/Transportation/New-York-CIty-Lyft-Uber-regulations/ [https://perm 
a.cc/5XPX-R58R]. 
3  E.g., Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of 
Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2018); Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization 
on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 131 (2017); Seth C. Oranburg, 
Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 399 (2015). 
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have weighed in on what they see as potential dangers arising from innovation 
and the perceived need for regulation. These regulations are presented as neces-
sary to protect consumers and a host of other interests,4 but there is a striking 
lack of attention paid to the costs of attempting to protect society from the ef-
fects of innovation. 
This Article fills that gap, using the battle between TNCs and the taxi in-
dustry as a case study. As a first step, Part I will describe the forces that led cit-
ies to regulate the taxi industry in the first place. A wave of innovation in the 
early twentieth century changed the face of transportation in large cities and 
forced lawmakers to consider ways to address the perceived flaws in transpor-
tation markets.5 One plausible solution was a cap on the number of taxis, which 
would serve to limit traffic congestion and raise wages for taxi drivers. Those 
goals were achieved, but at a terrible cost to consumers, drivers, and the broad-
er society. 
Part II will describe the costs of choosing the path of restrictive regula-
tions. Creating barriers to entry provides an immediate windfall to those fortu-
nate enough to find themselves inside when the walls are erected, but the bene-
fits dissipate rapidly through rising costs of entrance into the market. Given 
strong limits on total participation, new entrants must buy out existing partici-
pants and, while entrants are willing to pay for the right to extract government-
sanctioned monopoly profits, the entry price eventually swallows most or all of 
those profits. As a result, those who pay the higher cost of admission spend 
their time desperately seeking to avoid losing all that was spent to enter the 
market rather than defending continued windfalls. 
All the while, consumers are exploited by having to pay higher prices for 
lower quality services—not to mention having fewer options—than they would 
have in an innovative, competitive market.6 Part III shows how TNCs and other 
disruptive innovators can render moot existing barriers to entry, liberating con-
sumers and, in some cases, producers who have been trapped in inefficient 
modes of operation. In response to that disruption, and without a trace of irony, 
consumer “protection” arguments are employed in defense of the regimes that 
empower incumbents’ exploiting of consumers.7 These arguments are not of-
fered directly by the incumbents but by consumer advocates who are willing to 
stand athwart the tide of innovation and shout “no more.” Because innovation 
poses an existential threat, not to consumers but to the protected industry and 
 
4  E.g., Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1670–71 (2017). 
5  See infra Section I.B. 
6  See Judd Cramer & Alan B. Krueger, Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of 
Uber, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 177 (2016). 
7  E.g., Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 232, 250 (2018). 
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the consumer exploitation it represents,8 those producers privileged by govern-
ment must oppose innovation and the freedom it offers consumers. 
Part IV will show how the list of those protected by government barriers to 
competition in transportation markets goes beyond taxi drivers and taxi compa-
nies to encompass the financial institutions who provide capital to pay the high 
fixed costs of entry. Part V then offers suggestions for how the law should ap-
proach innovation and the disruption that comes with it, using ride-sharing ver-
sus taxis as a cautionary tale. Bringing together the lessons learned from the 
history of point-to-point transportation, Part V will show that seeking to tame 
markets inevitably harms consumers while benefitting wealthy, politically con-
nected industry incumbents. More importantly, when lawmakers choose to 
erect barriers to competition and innovation, they impede the natural evolution 
of markets and set the stage for more profound disruption when innovation is 
finally able to escape the constraints placed on it by lawmakers. By refusing to 
erect barriers to competition, lawmakers will invite smaller, more manageable 
disruption that occurs continually in competitive markets. 
I. A TALE OF TRANSPORTATION MARKETS 
TNCs are the most recent player to make an appearance on a stage that 
goes back as far as people have needed to travel. In order to understand how we 
got here and how we might progress into the future, this Part will offer a brief 
sketch of transportation markets with particular emphasis on the market forces 
that drive consumers and producers of transportation services. Part of that dis-
cussion must include the ways in which markets might perform sub-optimally. 
This Part will describe the regulatory actions taken by local governments in re-
sponse to perceived market imperfections, the traditional arguments in favor of 
those government interventions, and why the diagnosis that led to those policy 
choices may have been flawed. 
A. The Economics of Transportation 
1. Supply and Demand 
Getting from point A to point B has never been easy, whether accom-
plished under one’s own power or by purchasing transportation services in the 
aptly named point-to-point transportation market. As technology advances, in-
dividuals are less likely to rely solely on their own physical capacity, but those 
advances in transportation services cost something to produce. Prior to the in-
dustrial revolution, for example, you could avoid walking if you could find an 
animal to carry you, but that animal needed food, shelter, and other care in or-
der to be healthy enough to provide transportation services. Industrial modes of 
 
8  See, e.g., Jeremy Kidd, Fintech: Antidote to Rent-Seeking?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 165, 
176 (2018). 
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transportation also needed food (fossil fuels, for example), shelter (parking), 
and other forms of maintenance. Modern transportation has the same produc-
tion costs associated with it, and those costs of production are the primary de-
terminant of supply; as production costs decline, we can produce more and dif-
ferent kinds of transportation at current prices. By the same mechanism, higher 
prices mean that we can afford to produce more transportation at current pro-
duction costs.9 These facts are represented in what economists call the Law of 
Supply, that the amount of any good or service (including transportation) in-
creases as prices increase.10 
Demand for transportation services also evolves over time, yet follows 
similar, recognizable patterns even as the details change. Primarily, individuals 
need transportation to obtain the various things they need and want. For most of 
human history, for example, that meant moving to stave off starvation and/or 
avoid other modes of death. As individuals rise above a subsistence state, 
transportation also becomes a means to obtain goods and services that aren’t 
essential for survival but are desired for improving quality of life.11 When the 
things we desire are close at hand, our demand for transportation services will 
remain low. As more and more desirable things are available only at other loca-
tions, we increase our demand for transportation in order to obtain those things. 
Transportation is therefore what economists call a complementary good—a 
good that is used in tandem with another—for any good that exists outside of 
an individual’s immediate surroundings.12 
Demand for transportation responds to a number of factors, apart from our 
general preferences for things outside of our current surroundings. One of the 
 
9  To those not familiar with economic terminology, these two sentences may seem contra-
dictory, but they are not. To see why, imagine the following examples. Farmer A suddenly 
discovers a new, less expensive fertilizer that reduces the cost of producing each bushel of 
grain by $1. Farmer A can produce the same level of output for less, leaving resources avail-
able that Farmer A can use to produce additional grain, even if market prices—those paid by 
consumers—have not changed. Farmer B, on the other hand, has seen the market price for 
his corn rise by $1 per bushel. Farmer B will receive greater revenues for selling the same 
output, providing an expectation of additional resources that Farmer B can use to produce 
additional grain, even if production costs have not changed. Of course, the traditional eco-
nomic models—with increasing marginal costs—make a more accurate calculation of output 
and profits more complicated, but the basic conclusions from these simple examples are still 
valid. 
10  JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 12–15 (5th ed. 2011). 
11  See ACCESS DEV., NATIONAL CONSUMER STUDY SUMMARY: THE IMPACT OF RETAIL 
PROXIMITY ON CONSUMER PURCHASES 7 (2016–17), https://ww2.accessdevelopment.com/ 
hubfs/Access_Consumer_Spend_Research_Study_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQH3-HBFC]  
(last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
12  Some economists go one step further, arguing that transportation is “a friction . . . that 
must be incurred by individuals and firms to complete almost any market transaction.” 
Clifford Winston, On the Performance of the U.S. Transportation System: Caution Ahead, 
51 J. ECON. LIT. 773, 773 (2013). 
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most important is an individual’s income.13 As incomes rise, mere survival be-
comes less of an immediate concern.14 Individuals begin expanding their con-
sumption choices to the things that increase happiness and satisfaction, not just 
those things that sustain life.15 The higher the income, the more broad-ranging 
that list becomes and the more likely an individual will choose to hire transpor-
tation services in order to obtain them.16 Rising incomes should therefore in-
crease the total demand for transportation.17 Falling incomes push people to-
wards subsistence and make them more likely to be conservative in their 
consumption choices.18 For example, many individuals will be more likely to 
choose local goods rather than expend resources on transportation to access 
more distant substitutes.19 
A change in income might also change what type of transportation an indi-
vidual chooses to purchase, and there are many options. The market for trans-
portation can be thought of in broad terms, but that broad market is also divisi-
ble into a number of smaller segments. One possible example is the subdivision 
illustrated in Figure 1. If, for the purpose of this discussion, we define “trans-
portation” as moving people or goods from one place to another, we can think 
of dividing that market into whether goods or people are moved—whether we 
are transporting individuals to the goods they want or transporting the goods to 
them. The former would include things like walking, driving, riding public 
transportation, etc. The latter would include things like cargo ships, trains, big-
rig trucking, and so on, but might also include personal pick-up trucks in rural 
areas. Each of those sub-categories can be further subdivided, and one of those 
subdivisions is particularly relevant to the present discussion. Transportation of 
people to the goods and services they desire can be divided into personal trans-
portation, public transportation, and commercial, point-to-point transportation. 
 
13  Obviously, there are many for whom these concerns are more pressing. The point is not to 
diminish the reality of those concerns for individuals who are close to subsistence level but 
to note what happens to those who rise above that level. 
14  See David R. Henderson, Demand, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/libr 
ary/Enc/Demand.html [https://perma.cc/LW3C-S3SE] (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (“It is not 
just price that affects the quantity demanded. Income affects it too. As real income rises, 
people buy more of some goods (which economists call ‘normal goods’) and less of others 
(called ‘inferior goods’).”). 
15  See id. 
16  See id. 
17  Certain forms of transportation are considered inferior goods, meaning that rising incomes 
should lead to a decrease in demand. See id. Overall, however, demand for transportation 
services should rise with incomes. 
18  The closer someone is to starvation, the less willing they will be to spend any of their lim-
ited resources on non-essential amenities. 
19  Even if Honeycrisp apples (grown in New York and New England) are accepted as hav-
ing “set themselves apart from other apples,” HONEYCRISP.COM, https://honeycrisp.com/hon 
eycrisp_apple.html [https://perma.cc/M56V-BJUR] (last visited Jan. 11, 2020), a poor family 
will likely choose more bland red-delicious apples because doing so leaves more income to 
be spent on other foods or other necessities. 
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The first is people transporting themselves by means they own or control, typi-
cally by car but also by bike, motorcycle, boat, airplane, etc. The second is pay-
ing a municipality or third-party contractor to use the public transportation sys-
tem (subways, bus systems, trolleys, etc.). The third is people paying a third-
party for transport services or point-to-point transportation. Historically, you 
could hire a carriage for this purpose, but those were almost entirely replaced 
by buses, trains and, of course, taxi cabs. TNCs fall into this subsector of the 
market. 
FIGURE 1 
All forms of transportation are, to some extent, substitutes.20 For example, 
if individuals want a particular good that is not currently in their homes, they 
can either pay someone to transport the good to their home or transport them-
selves to the good. If the choice is self-transport, they can choose between a 
mode of transport that they own and control, or they can hire someone to 
transport them. For every good that we purchase, it is likely that a combination 
of forms has been used, such as when goods are transported as far as a local 
store and the consumer transported herself to the store. Because individuals 
have finite budgets,21 the relative prices of the various forms of transport will 
factor heavily into the decision of which form to employ. The negative rela-
tionship between price and quantity purchased is what economists call the Law 
of Demand.22 All consumers will also base their choices on non-price factors, 
 
20  Substitute goods are those that can be used in place of each other. See WALTER 
NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND 
EXTENSIONS 184–85 (12th ed. 2017). 
21  Even the wealthiest individuals have finite budgets, although the constraints imposed by 
those budgets are significantly less binding than those of more modest means. 
22  Henderson, supra note 14. 
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such as aesthetics, convenience, and other amenities.23 As incomes rise, those 
non-price factors will become more important.24 
If the price of a particular form of transportation is relatively high, there 
will be few consumers demanding that form of transportation, but more pro-
ducers will be willing to supply that form.25 Relatively low prices will result in 
a large number of consumers demanding transportation of that form, but pro-
ducers will be unable or unwilling to provide that transportation at that price, 
creating a shortage.26 One of the fundamental truths of economics is that 
“[p]eople respond to incentives,”27 and either a shortage or a glut (prices too 
high) will create powerful incentives. With a shortage, there will be a lot of ea-
ger consumers; some enterprising individual will raise the price just a little and 
capture the extra profits that are represented by consumers standing around, un-
able to get where they need to go.28 That single entrepreneur’s actions will sig-
nal to others that extra profits can be made if the price is raised, leading to ris-
ing prices and an elimination of the shortage.29 By the same token, when there 
is a glut, sellers will have lots of unused capacity—either buses that run half-
 
23  Consumers choose goods and services based on a combination of price and quality, with 
“quality” embodying these amenities. One example that has recently gained notoriety is con-
sumers’ lower preference for ugly produce. See Is “Ugly Produce” the Key to Our Food 
Waste Problem?, CBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ugly-produce- 
the-key-to-our-food-waste-problem/ [https://perma.cc/5LKJ-RKUM]. 
24  Rising incomes allow consumers to select higher quality goods because price becomes a 
less-binding constraint. E.g., Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy to Employment-Based Health In-
surance and the Distribution of Well-Being, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 99 (2006) 
(“[L]ower-wage workers, in an effort to limit the amount of increase in their real income go-
ing to medical care, would choose policies that limit cost by providing smaller amounts of 
new technology; on the other hand, higher-wage workers would be more able and willing to 
devote more of their income to new medical care, preferring to invest more in higher-quality 
care.”). 
25  This is nothing more than the Law of Supply. E.g., William A. Drennan, Changing Inven-
tion Economics by Encouraging Corporate Inventors to Sell Patents, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1045, 1066 n.88 (2004); Robert M. Hardaway, Taxi and Limousines: The Last Bastion of 
Economic Regulation, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL’Y 319, 352 (2000). 
26  See, e.g., Hugh Rockoff, Price Controls, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib 
.org/library/Enc/PriceControls.html [https://perma.cc/VFB2-DN3Z] (last visited Jan. 29, 
2020) (explaining the shortage caused when government price controls prohibit relatively 
low prices from rising in response to market forces). 
27  STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3 
(rev. ed. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28  E.g., James M. Koelemay, Jr., Case Note, Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 
(7th Cir. 1974), 53 TEX. L. REV. 551, 555 (1975) (“[A] shortage would not reduce the num-
ber of suppliers reasonably available to Mullis, but would simply cause prices to rise, allow-
ing Mullis to obtain a supplier by offering a higher price.”). 
29  Russell S. Sobel, Entrepreneurship, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Enc/Entrepreneurship.html [https://perma.cc/KKZ7-XAZD] (last visited Jan. 24, 
2020) (explaining the Kirznerian entrepreneur as one who “discovers previously unnoticed 
profit opportunities” and triggers “a process in which these newly discovered profit opportu-
nities are then acted on in the marketplace until market COMPETITION eliminates the profit 
opportunity”) (alteration in original). 
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empty, or cabs that sit idle all day, or car lots that have too many of last year’s 
models.30 To avoid the costs of having idle capacity, an enterprising seller will 
lower prices and begin to gain profits from utilizing her excess.31 That will be a 
signal to some other sellers to do the same and to high-cost sellers to get out of 
the market.32 As a result, prices will fall and the glut will go away.33 
2. Market Perfection and Imperfection 
These market forces work on their own, without any specific direction by 
government agents; millions of independent producers and consumers just re-
spond to the prices in the market and, by doing so, create tomorrow’s prices.34 
Those prices cause a new round of reactions and further price changes until, in 
theory, the market reaches a point where the amount demanded by consumers 
is exactly the same as the amount supplied, and everyone is happy.35 In the ab-
sence of any distortions, the point-to-point transportation market could be left 
alone and price and quantity would fluctuate as the factors of supply and de-
mand fluctuate.36 Combined with competition between producers, market forc-
es would yield a variety of transportation options at prices that consumers could 
afford. 
Unfortunately, we do not live in a world without distortions, so the market 
for transportation may not function as well as desired.37 One way that a market 
 
30  Surpluses exist in many markets, when supply outpaces demand. E.g., Ryosuke Kojima, 
The Influenza Vaccine Market: From Shortage to Surplus, 14 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 33, 33 
(2009) (describing “millions of doses of influenza vaccine [that] remain unsold” every year). 
In the market for transportation services, the shortage is not vaccines sitting around on 
shelves, but transportation options—personal cars, taxis, etc.—sitting around on streets, in 
garages, or in parking lots. 
31  See Sobel, supra note 29. 
32  See id. 
33  See id. 
34  See generally LEONARD E. READ, I, PENCIL: MY FAMILY TREE AS TOLD TO LEONARD E. 
READ (1958), available at https://fee.org/resources/i-pencil/ [https://perma.cc/SY3S-SUNC]. 
35  Economists refer to this point as “market equilibrium.” See HARRISON, supra note 10, at 
15–17. 
36  The standard assumption of economic models is ceteris paribus, that all things remain 
constant. In an unchanging world, the market would reach and maintain a stable equilibrium 
price and quantity. F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Process, 5 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 
9, 15 (2002) (“[T]rue equilibrium presupposes that the relevant facts have already been dis-
covered and that the process of competition has thus come to an end.”). The world we actual-
ly live in, of course, is anything but unchanging; even if the market could reach equilibrium, 
it would only stay there for the briefest of instants—perhaps only seconds—before changing 
circumstances would force price and quantity to change. Equilibrium, then, should be under-
stood as a point of attraction, towards which market forces move price and quantity, rather 
than an obtainable result. See generally READ, supra note 34. 
37  Of course, falling short of perfection does not mean that the market is incurably flawed. 
Rather, it means exactly what it sounds like, that it falls somewhere short of perfection. It 
may be a small divergence from the ideal outcome, or it may be a major divergence, and on-
ly further investigation will reveal whether or not the divergence is sufficiently large as to 
destroy confidence in the ability of the market to produce beneficial results. 
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may be distorted is through the presence of externalities, negative or positive.38 
An externality occurs when someone outside of the transaction is affected by 
the transaction.39 If the externality is negative, then the parties to the transaction 
can shift some of the cost onto innocent bystanders.40 As a result, the market 
price will be too low, and more of that good or service will be produced than is 
ideal.41 Any form of transportation that emits exhaust will impose this type of 
spillover cost, as anyone nearby will breathe in the exhaust, regardless of 
whether they received transportation services.42 If the externality is positive, 
then bystanders receive a partial benefit from a transaction they had no role in 
generating, resulting in a price that is too high and a quantity that is too low.43 
Other distortions may involve excessive market power,44 imperfect information 
or information asymmetries,45 or high transaction costs.46 Importantly, while 
these distortions are often referred to as “market failures,” and used to justify 
government regulation of the industry, they can just as easily be the result of 
direct government action and, in that case, should be called “government fail-
ures.”47 
 
38  See R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 23 (1988). 
39  Id. at 23–24. 
40  See id. at 24. 
41  E.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2011) (“A 
party may have an incentive to engage in an activity if the activity’s private benefits exceed 
its private costs even though, as a result of the externality, the activity is undesirable as its 
social costs exceed its social benefits.”). 
42  Lincoln L. Davies, Energy, Consumption, and the Amorality of Energy Law, 109 AJIL 
UNBOUND 147, 149 (2015) (“Nor does the individual starting the car feel the full conse-
quences of that decision. They do not breathe the exhaust, or taste the water contaminated by 
the oil spill, or feel the pain of the sage grouse displaced by the extraction well pad, even 
though that chain of events is put in motion every time they push the gas pedal.”). 
43  See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. Legal Stud. 21, 22 (2009) 
(“[N]egative externalities result in oversupply of some dangerous activities, while positive 
externalities result in undersupply of some beneficial ones.”). 
44  See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 77, 112 (“Presumably, the less restrictive alternative requirement, if properly enforced, 
will induce firms to achieve cognizable benefits without simultaneously creating or exercis-
ing market power, thus defeating a market failure and maximizing the welfare of consum-
ers.”). 
45  Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1, 
33 (2016) (“[I]nformation asymmetry, often found in markets for services, can lead to a 
market failure that results in too-low quality products, leaving consumers who demand—and 
are willing to pay for—high quality services without any options.”). 
46  Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case for a 
Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579, 605 (2005) 
(“[E]xcessive transaction costs and positive externalities create a bottleneck or market failure 
. . . .”). For a simple explanation of the transaction cost concept, see Jeremy Kidd, Kinder-
garten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 144–45 (2014). 
47  E.g., Jeremy Kidd & Joseph R. Padgett, Trucker Shortage as Government Failure, 1 LOY. 
U. CHI. J. REG. COMPLIANCE 7, 10–11 (2016). For the general argument about government-
created “failures” in the market, see R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 28 (1960); Kidd, supra note 46, at 149–51. 
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B. Evolution of the Modern Taxi 
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, two factors changed the face of 
urban America in a way that gave rise to the taxi industry. The first was rapidly 
rising population density.48 The second was the advent of affordable automo-
biles, subject to constant improvements.49 As population density rose and peo-
ple began to crowd out agricultural space and even some manufacturing space, 
people needed to travel more to obtain the things they needed. Cars also be-
came much cheaper to buy during this time period,50 which would normally re-
sult in more car ownership, but the rise in population density also made it far 
more costly to keep a car in the city, as parking became relatively more 
scarce.51 Cities needed a new version of an old form of transportation, and cars 
quickly replaced horse-drawn carriages in the early years of the Twentieth Cen-
tury;52 most cabbies likely switched to cars, remaining part of the point-to-point 
transportation industry. 
As a concept, taxis had much to recommend them. A personal vehicle usu-
ally spends a good deal of the day idle, which makes it relatively costly. How-
ever, it also offers the immediate convenience of travel to wherever the owner 
wishes to go, assuming there are roads. As keeping a car became more expen-
sive, some entrepreneurial individuals likely noticed that the cost of maintain-
ing a car was not prohibitive if it were possible to use the car to generate reve-
nue by keeping the car busy doing what it does best—provide transportation 
services. Cities were, at this time, building other forms of public transport,53 but 
 
48  For example, New York City went from a population of 3,427,202 in 1900 to 6,930,446 
in 1930, an increase of 102.2%; Chicago, during the same time period, went from a popula-
tion of 1,698,575 to 3,376,438 in 1930, an increase of 98.8%. Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/ [https:// 
perma.cc/T99S-LEWV] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
49  See Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 23, 34–35 (2003) (de-
scribing the rapid pace of innovation at Ford Motor Company in the first two decades of the 
Twentieth Century, which made Ford’s cars cheaper and better). 
50  Id. 
51  Even the same number of parking spaces would not suffice to handle all the automobiles 
brought by new residents. 
52  GREGORY DROZDZ, CAB AND COACH 25–26 (1990). 
53  The first elevated railway in New York City, the IRT Ninth Avenue Line, opened July 3, 
1868, followed by other elevated lines and, on October 27, 1904, the first underground line. 
James Nevius, The Elevated Era, CURBED N.Y. (June 27, 2018), https://ny.curbed.com 
/2018/6/27/17507424/new-york-city-elevated-train-history-transportation [https://perma 
.cc/4JLA-HB57]; New York City Subway Opens, HISTORY (last updated Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/new-york-city-subway-opens [https://perma.cc 
/3XR5-LXT3]. The lines were built by the city and leased to private companies to operate. 
See New Subways for New York: The Dual System of Rapid Transit (1913), 
https://www.nycsubway.org/wiki/Chapter_1:_Dual_System_of_Rapid_Transit [https://perm 
a.cc/CF3R-6E4H] (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). Chicago’s “L” first opened for business on 
June 6, 1892, and the first full circuit of the Loop was finished in 1897. The Chicago L, CHI. 
ARCHITECTURE CTR., http://www.architecture.org/learn/resources/buildings-of-chicago/buil 
ding/the-chicago-l/ [https://perma.cc/AR3A-MZ3S] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). 
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bus routes and subway systems have fixed points for pick-up and drop-off, 
making them less convenient than a car that could pick you up at your home 
and drop you off at your desired location. 
The problem with this development, as exemplified in the case of New 
York City, was that the incentives to join the ranks of for-hire cabbies were, 
perhaps, too great.54 Recall that this was an entirely new market or, at least, a 
complete renovation of the old for-hire carriage market with automobiles. The 
opening of this market would have appeared to be like the economic equivalent 
to the Oklahoma land rush,55 with tremendous opportunity for those who got in 
early. The result was a large number of early entrants,56 and the seeming overa-
bundance of supply in the point-to-point transportation market led many cab-
bies to complain that the wages were not sufficient to compensate for the time 
and cost of being a cabbie.57 
Faced with these concerns, early Twentieth Century policy makers faced 
the same difficult decision as faces policy makers today—whether to intervene. 
Refraining from regulation is so infrequently on the menu that it can be diffi-
cult to remember that government regulation is not the only way market condi-
tions change. In the case of taxi drivers and their complaints, it is important to 
point out that sellers in every market are likely to complain when they have too 
much competition that it makes it impossible for the complainants to earn a 
“proper” living. It is human nature to want more money for less work, and cab-
bies of the early Twentieth Century would not have been immune. One possible 
policy response, therefore, would be to do nothing and allow market self-
regulation to occur. The glut of point-to-point transportation service providers 
would have led to some cabbies reducing their fares in an attempt to reduce ex-
cess capacity—their idle time. That reduction would lead those who had given 
up the highest-valued alternative forms of employment58 to stop being cabbies 
and would have incentivized more consumers to take a cab. Over time, quantity 
demanded would have risen and quantity supplied would have declined, reduc-
ing the glut. 
 
54  See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The 
Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 77 (1996) (“While fewer people could af-
ford to ride a taxi, the number of taxicabs skyrocketed . . . . Capacity and demand were mov-
ing in opposite directions.”). 
55  See Land Run of 1889, OKLA. HISTORICAL SOC’Y, https://www.okhistory.org/publications/ 
enc/entry.php?entry=LA014 [https://perma.cc/M5B8-UPBN] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). 
56  PRICE WATERHOUSE, ANALYSIS OF TAXICAB DEREGULATION & RE-REGULATION 4 (1993) 
(“In an unregulated environment, the low cost of entry attracts individuals who have limited 
employment options. Thus, during periods of high unemployment [like the Great Depres-
sion], independent taxi operators flood the market.”); see also Dempsey, supra note 54, at 
77. 
57  “Cut-throat competition in a business of this kind always produces chaos. Drivers are 
working as long as sixteen hours per day, in their desperate efforts to eke out a living.” 
Dempsey, supra note 54, at 77 (quoting Taxicab Chaos, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 1933)). 
58  In economic terms, those with the highest opportunity costs. Armen A. Alchian, Cost, in 3 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 404 (David L. Sills ed., 1968). 
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Cities did not take that path, instead turning to regulatory interventions to 
“fix” excess supply and too-low prices. Most large cities imposed firm limits 
on the number of taxis that were allowed to operate in the city.59 The typical 
regulatory form was to implement a medallion system, where a certain number 
of medallions were sold, and anyone attempting to operate a taxi without a me-
dallion was subject to penalties.60 Over the years, most cities have abandoned 
their medallion systems, but other methods of controlling supply have been 
tried.61 In some cities, for example, all taxi drivers must work for one of a small 
number of licensed taxi companies.62 Even setting aside the potential for ex-
ploitation of drivers, such a regime grants oligopolistic power to the favored 
taxi companies, allowing them to restrict supply in order to maintain higher 
prices.63 Even in cities where express limits on supply have not been imple-
mented, there are often rigid price controls, in the form of detailed fare sched-
ules, which continue to this day.64 
C. Correcting Externalities 
If point-to-point transportation markets work reasonably well, these gov-
ernment interventions would serve only to create barriers to competition. Put 
another way, government attempts at “fixing” these alleged problems might 
have exacerbated them or caused entirely new problems. A defense of these in-
terventions is likely to center on the need to minimize harms arising from the 
market, such as pollution or congestion from additional vehicles on the roads.65 
If negative externalities exist, government intervention might be able to facili-
tate more efficient market outcomes. The defining characteristic of a negative 
externality is that there are costs that should be, but are not, considered when 
individuals choose to enter transactions.66 As a result, the market yields higher 
 
59  HARA ASSOCS., INC., TAXICAB REGULATION IN NORTH AMERICA 6–11 (2012), available at 
https://studylib.net/doc/5920613/hara-associates---taxicab-regulation-in-north-america-doc 
[https://perma.cc/ZP5J-FWVS]. 
60  See id. at 6, 10–11. 
61  Id. at 17–27. 
62  Id. at 45 (describing Los Angeles’ “franchise” system, where companies bid for exclusive 
service rights to particular areas of the city). 
63  Oligopoly is a variation on monopoly, where a single producer has significant control 
over price. George J. Stigler, Monopoly, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Enc/Monopoly.html [https://perma.cc/4W3J-5PQ7] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). An 
oligopoly differs from a monopoly only in the number of suppliers in the market but, if the 
numbers are small enough and the existing participants are protected from new competitors, 
they can jointly act like a monopoly. See id. 
64  E.g., Department of For-Hire Vehicles, DC.GOV, https://dfhv.dc.gov/page/taxicab-fares 
[https://perma.cc/H366-2LQW] (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). 
65  Congestion, of course, is a function of many different factors, including the choices by 
government officials regarding the capacity of roads and mass transit options. See, e.g., Win-
ston, supra note 12, at 784–86. 
66  Any discussion of externalities should at least mention the critiques of externality theory 
raised by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase, who argued that even the terminology presumes 
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total quantity and lower price than the socially optimal outcome, an outcome 
consistent with the circumstances at the beginning of the taxi industry.67 Gov-
ernment intervention might therefore prevent transactions that are a net drain 
on society. 
The negative-externality story is plausible, but is undercut by the possibil-
ity of positive externalities, and the solution imposed by municipalities is fun-
damentally flawed so that it likely made things worse. First, a negative exter-
nality would lead to too many cabs on the roads and prices that were not high 
enough.68 A positive externality—in this case, each taxi can replace more than 
a single car, and may replace dozens of cars, reducing congestion on the roads 
and in parking—would result in both output and price being too low. A positive 
externality operates in similar fashion to a negative externality, but with the to-
tal benefit to society being greater than the benefit to the individual.69 As a re-
sult, individuals don’t enter into transactions that would, on net, be beneficial to 
society. 
To combine the two concepts, a negative externality leads to higher social 
costs while a positive externality leads to higher social benefits. It is therefore 
possible that the extra costs of taxis are more than offset by the extra benefits of 
taxis. Similarly, a negative externality leads to inefficiently high production and 
consumption, while a positive externality leads to inefficiently low production. 
Whether the total quantity is too high or too low depends on the magnitudes of 
the externalities, and there is no reason to conclude, a priori, that limiting the 
number of taxis is needed to avoid excessive social costs. 
Figure 2 demonstrates how the presence of a positive externality alters the 
traditional analysis of negative externalities in the taxi industry, pre-regulation. 
In an unrestricted market with no externality, price and quantity measures 
would move towards the point where demand (D1) = supply (S1). At that point, 
quantity (q+) is greater than would be expected if the parties bore all the costs 
of their transaction (q*), and price (p+) is lower than would be expected with all 
costs considered (p*). The shaded triangle represents the total extra cost im-
posed on society from these transactions,70 and government intervention might 
be justified to avoid these costs. 
 
rather than proves the existence of a wrongdoer and a victim. Coase, supra note 47, at 2. In-
stead, Coase argued that a search for solutions should include a willingness to have the “vic-
tim” change its behavior, if doing so would minimize the cost of a solution. Id. at 2–6. 
67  See, e.g., id. at 3–4. 
68  Although, notice that the reason price should be higher is that it needs to cover all the 
costs. One of the primary ways in which governments combat negative externalities is to tax 
transactions in which they arise. A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 224 (4th ed. 
1932). That means that “solving” a negative externality would likely not have satisfied cab-
bies, as it would not have increased their wages. 
69  See Bryan Caplan, Externalities, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/ 
library/Enc/Externalities.html [https://perma.cc/SA8R-LQCB] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). 
70  To be clear, each transaction to the left of q* has a greater benefit (represented by the 
marginal benefit (demand) curve) than the total cost (represented by S2, the societal marginal 
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FIGURE 2 
A contemporaneous positive externality means that there are also social 
benefits that are not captured by the individual consumer, so we include D2 to 
represent the social marginal benefit (demand) curve. The socially optimal lev-
el of output is now q+, rather than q*, and the shaded rectangle no longer repre-
sents socially costly transactions because the total value of the transactions is 
greater than the total cost. Negative externalities reduce social welfare and 
positive externalities increase it. The net effect in the presence of both positive 
and negative externalities will depend on their relative magnitudes, but it is 
possible for the socially desirable outcome to be more taxis, not fewer. 
Moreover, even if the market were imperfect, there would be no guarantee 
that resulting government intervention would not be worse.71 In every case of a 
negative externality, the primary difficulty that arises with government inter-
vention is choosing the “correct” level of output.72 Deriving the necessary sup-
ply and demand curves is largely beyond our analytical capabilities,73 to say 
nothing of the difficulty—if not impossibility—of predicting the complex hu-
 
cost (supply) curve). Between q* and q+, the private cost of the transaction (represented by 
S1, the private marginal cost (supply) curve) is still less than the benefit and, because mar-
ginal benefits are falling and marginal costs are rising, the excess burden on society increas-
es with every transaction past q*. 
71  E.g., Kidd, supra note 46, at 153 (“Greater obstacles [to efficient markets] will mean 
greater imperfections from voluntary bargains, but also that any mistakes made during gov-
ernment interventions will be harder to undo, so the harm to individuals and to society will 
be far more lasting.”); Kidd & Padgett, supra note 47, at 16–19 (describing the problems 
caused by federal trucking regulation). 
72  See Caplan, supra note 69. 
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man interactions that are foundational to any such calculation.74 Notwithstand-
ing the ongoing effort by market actors to predict present or future demand, 
there is no such thing as a real-world supply or demand curve. And yet, regula-
tors would need to set the right number of taxi medallions. Regulators would 
also need to properly measure the cost of the externality—a complex task but at 
least within the realm of possibility.75 
One possible response is that any reduction in output would be beneficial 
even if it doesn’t fully eliminate the waste. That ignores the possibility of posi-
tive externalities, as well as the likelihood that regulators will overshoot, rather 
than undershoot, in their reductive efforts. If regulators set the number of taxi 
medallions where quantity will be less than the socially optimum level, there is 
another set of costs to deal with. Consumers and producers are willing to enter 
into transactions that do no harm to anyone else but are prohibited from doing 
so for no reason other than that government regulators were off in their calcula-
tions. Even worse, governments move slowly and deliberately, while markets 
are dynamic and constantly changing.76 Therefore, even if regulators were 
lucky enough to get the number of taxi medallions correct at the outset, that 
lucky guess would not be durable, likely becoming an inefficient level of out-
put within days or hours. Fluctuations in the market would guarantee that the 
mandated level of output is wrong, possibly catastrophically wrong. For exam-
ple, issuing too few medallions could result in consumers being stranded at 
times without access to transportation, increasing the chance that they will be-
come the victims of crime.77 
D. Transaction Costs 
Alternatively, one might argue that the real problem was one of transaction 
costs. As proposed initially by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase,78 and expanded 
 
74  Id. at 84, 91; see also LUDVIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGIC 
ANALYSIS 97–105 (J. Kahane trans., 1981). 
75  For example, regulators have been attempting to calculate the “social cost of carbon,” one 
way of representing the optimal price of greenhouse gas emissions and, indirectly, the cost of 
the externality. See William Pizer et al., Using and Improving the Social Cost of Carbon, 
346 SCIENCE 1189, 1189–90 (2014). But see Julian Morris, Climate Change, Catastrophe, 
Regulation and the Social Cost of Carbon, REASON FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://reason. 
org/policy-study/climate-change-catastrophe-regulation-and-the-social-cost-of-carbon/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/QP5A-U5MP] (describing perceived flaws in the methodology). 
76  See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Pro-
cess: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 60, 61, 70–73, 81–82 (1997) (describing an 
Austrian approach toward market equilibrium). 
77  E.g., Woman Fatally Shot While Waiting for Taxi in Inglewood; Manhunt Underway, 
ABC7 (Sept. 21, 2017), https://abc7.com/woman-in-inglewood-shot-dead-while-waiting-for-
taxi/2438876/ [https://perma.cc/2JGT-MWJJ]. 
78  R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27 n.54 (1959) 
(“[T]he legal delimitation of rights provides the starting point for the rearrangement of rights 
through market transactions. Such transactions are not costless, with a result that the initial 
delimitation of rights may be maintained even though some other would be more efficient.”). 
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in economic literature,79 transaction costs are often the source of market ineffi-
ciencies, and reducing them may solve the market inefficiency.80 One possible 
explanation for the overabundance of taxis in New York streets and elsewhere 
is that, in the early Twentieth Century, it was difficult to connect someone de-
siring a ride with someone who operated a cab.81 Telephone service existed in a 
much more limited fashion than today, so calling for a taxi would have been 
difficult. Moreover, the citizens band (CB) radio had not yet been invented,82 
so even if you could easily call for a taxi, the taxi would have to remain sta-
tionary, waiting for an assignment. That would lead to a tremendous amount of 
down time, when the taxi driver was not making money. The only efficient way 
of obtaining a fare and making a living would be to drive around, hoping to be 
hailed. The costs of connecting willing drivers with willing riders were high 
enough that an inefficiently high number of taxis would have been on the road 
in order to satisfy the demand for taxi rides. The high number of taxis also 
meant a high level of competition, so taxi drivers would have found it difficult 
to pass on any of the costs to riders; hence, the low wages that taxi drivers 
complained of. 
If transaction costs are the cause of excess supply, then what is the solu-
tion? Coase’s writings encourage two possible paths: first, enact solutions that 
reduce transaction costs;83 second, if government action is necessary, take great 
care while attempting to fix market inefficiencies, since transaction costs will 
cause government failures to linger far longer and impose far higher costs.84 
Given the level of technology available in the early years of the Twentieth Cen-
 
79  For an expansive explanation of transaction costs and its importance to economic analy-
sis, see MICHAEL C. MUNGER, TOMORROW 3.0: TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE SHARING 
ECONOMY 2–4, 71–72 (2018); see also Brian L. Frye, Copyright as Charity, 39 NOVA L. 
REV. 343, 350 (2015) (“[T]hese direct [government] subsidies [to charities] are vulnerable to 
market failures caused by rent-seeking and transaction costs.”); Merrill F. Hoopengardner, 
Note, Nontraditional Venture Capital: An Economic Development Strategy for Alaska, 20 
ALASKA L. REV. 357, 367 (2003) (“[S]ome economists believe that the lack of well-
developed rural venture capital markets may be caused by ‘market failures that result from 
imperfect information and high transaction costs.’ ”); George M. Padis, Note, Overcoming 
the “Energy Paradox” in the Built Environment, 42 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 85, 101 (2011) (“[I]n 
green building there are potential challenges caused by market failure—the high transaction 
costs associated with differentiated stakeholders—and irrational actors.”). 
80  See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (describing firms 
as a solution which facilitates long-term production by reducing the cost of bargaining). 
81  After all, “all most people want is the service the durable good can provide.” MUNGER, 
supra note 79, at 74. “I do not really want to own a car; I want convenient, safe, and reliable 
transportation services.” Id. at 76. 
82  The CB radio was invented by Al Gross in 1948. Al Gross: The Walkie-Talkie, 
LEMELSON-MIT, https://lemelson.mit.edu/resources/al-gross [https://perma.cc/4T86-25S4  
(last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
83  See Coase, supra note 47, at 2; Coase, supra note 78, at 15–16 (arguing that allocation of 
enforceable property rights to radio spectrum would reduce transaction costs and facilitate 
efficient use of radio spectrum). 
84  Coase, supra note 47, at 19; Kidd, supra note 46, at 154. 
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tury, the first option may have been unavailable but, in adopting fixed limits on 
taxis—a more traditional, non-Coaseian solution to the problem—civic leaders 
at the time may have sent their cities down the path that Coase warned about, 
one with higher costs that linger, perhaps for decades.85 
It did not take long before technologies arose that would reduce the trans-
action costs in point-to-point transportation markets. A mere eight years after 
introduction of the medallion system in New York City, for example, the CB 
radio was invented, allowing for more efficient connection of riders and driv-
ers.86 If cities had waited before imposing a regulatory “solution,” there may 
never have been a need. Once the regulations were in place and competition 
was effectively constrained, it was unlikely that the regulations would ever be 
removed. As discussed in the following Part, those in the industry—who were 
enjoying the ability to charge above-market rates for taxi services—had be-
come invested in the persistence of the existing regime, making any change un-
likely, at best. 
II. A SOLUTION, BUT AT WHAT COST? 
The choices made by lawmakers and regulators in response to technologi-
cal changes in the transportation industry may have been motivated by pure in-
tentions, but the consequences were less than desirable. In a classic case of the 
law of unintended consequences,87 policies ostensibly designed to protect driv-
ers and consumers ended up hurting them, as well as society at large, by grant-
ing monopoly power to medallion owners. This Part will establish that a medal-
lion system—or any systematic effort to inhibit entry into the market—has a 
dark side that should be considered but traditionally is not. 
To begin, assume that a city implements a medallion system, either to 
counter a perceived negative externality or perhaps merely to protect favored 
market incumbents in the point-to-point transportation industry. Either way, the 
immediate effect of the policy is to restrict taxi services proportional to the 
number of medallions issued,88 likely to a level below what would exist without 
government restrictions. Each licensed taxi driver is granted some additional 
 
85  For an explanation regarding the higher costs associated with the type of barriers to entry 
that medallion systems represent, see infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. For an ex-
planation of how the taxi industry, once entrenched, will fight to maintain those costly barri-
ers, see infra Section III.B.1–4. 
86  See Al Gross: The Walkie-Talkie, supra note 82. 
87  Economist and Nobel Laureate F.A. Hayek was not the originator of the concept of unin-
tended consequences, but he is well known for his quote that “[t]he curious task of econom-
ics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can 
design.” 1 F. A. HAYEK, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF FRIEDRICH AUGUST HAYEK 76 (W. W. Bartley, III et al. eds., 1988). 
88  There will be some number of illegal taxi services who will risk detection and prosecu-
tion, but that number is likely to be low if the city has a reasonable budget for enforcement. 
If the city chooses not to enforce its medallion system, then the effects described herein will 
not occur. 
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level of market power, which the driver can use to raise the price. Because this 
price will be higher than the cost of producing taxi services,89 profits per taxi 
should increase. These profits will be higher than those obtainable in an unre-
stricted market, so they represent what economists call monopoly rents.90 The 
total rents arising from the government intervention will be divided among 
market participants that were not forced out of the market by the municipality’s 
implementing the medallion system. 
It is important at this juncture to make clear that what is being discussed 
here are not traditional profits earned by innovative businesses. Profitable in-
novation includes reduction of production costs or creation of new products 
that are in high demand because they make consumers’ lives better. Those prof-
its serve a useful social function, in that they motivate further innovation that 
makes all our lives better.91 Instead, the profits—or monopoly rents—in this 
scenario are those that arise as governments take action that inhibits competi-
tion. Without competition, sellers can maintain high profits without having to 
cater to the demands of consumers.92 Imposing mandatory limits on supply, as 
with a medallion system, is one way to inhibit markets, protect incumbents, and 
generate monopoly rents, but there are many others, such as trade barriers (tar-
iffs, quotas, export subsidies) and a host of regulatory barriers, to competi-
tion.93 
The counterpart to the windfall enjoyed by medallion owners is a loss suf-
fered by other taxi drivers, those who would have provided taxi services but 
were not granted a medallion, and consumers who are unable to find a taxi be-
cause taxi services have been restricted. Even though there are drivers willing 
to provide a service and consumers willing to pay those drivers, the medallion 
system prohibits a voluntary bargain between them. Economists refer to this 
phenomenon as deadweight loss, the loss to society when individuals are pro-
hibited from entering into voluntary transactions solely because government 
 
89  This requires a simplifying assumption, that medallions are given to those who are the 
lowest-cost providers of point-to-point transportation services. In reality, it is likely that poli-
tics will enter the initial decision of who will receive medallions, so costs for some sellers 
may be higher than c, and profits may be lower than indicated here. Over time, however, a 
higher-cost seller will have strong incentives to sell the medallion to a seller with a lower 
production cost, who will be willing to pay a premium to gain the extra profits. 
90  E.g., David Hurlbut, Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol for 
Related Intellectual Property, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 382 n.8 (1994) (“Monopoly rents 
are additional producer earnings that exist because of barriers to competition, and are thus 
conceptually different from profits that derive from successful market competition.”). 
91  Robert Cooter, An Escape from Poverty: Developing Productive Organizations, 12 SW. J. 
L. & TRADE AM. 181, 183 (2006). 
92  See Kidd, supra note 8, at 170. 
93  E.g., Jeremy Kidd, Quacks or Bootleggers: Who’s Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, 75 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 367, 441–42 (2018) (describing how disclosure requirements could 
hinder the hedge fund model and protect traditional financial institutions’ market power). 
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regulations do not allow it.94 Particularly relevant to the present discussion, 
deadweight loss increases proportionally to the monopoly rents obtained by the 
protected industry incumbents.95 
The medallion system purports to fix the problem of too many taxis on the 
road. The second half of municipal regulation of the point-to-point transporta-
tion industry purports to fix the problem of too little remuneration by fixing 
taxi rates at some level.96 Unlike a price floor (e.g., minimum wage laws) or a 
price ceiling (e.g., rent-control statutes), taxi fare schedules establish a single 
method for determining the price of a taxi ride.97 As a preliminary matter, the 
fact that prices are prohibited from fluctuating means that most of the equili-
brating mechanisms of the market have been eliminated.98 In addition, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3, the refusal to allow price to fluctuate creates addi-
tional deadweight loss. 
As a baseline, we assume that demand is defined by D1 and supply by S1. 
Under those circumstances, the market will trend toward a quantity q+ and a 
price of p+. The medallion system restricts the quantity of taxi services to a 
maximum of q* and causes the market price to rise to p*.99 The new higher 
price increases profits, which would be represented by the rectangle between p* 
and c1, the cost of producing taxi services at that level of output. The policy al-
so generates deadweight loss, represented by the triangle created by D1 and S1, 









94  Salil K. Mehra, Competition Law for a Post-Scarcity World, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 23 
(2016). 
95  See id. at 24. 
96  Fixed rates were designed to halt “fare wars” that were lowering drivers’ wages. U.S. 
DEP’T OF TRANSP., TAXICAB REGULATION IN U.S. CITIES 6–7 (1983), https://ia801302.us. 
archive.org/17/items/taxicabregulatio00shaw/taxicabregulatio00shaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6BGC-5A6W]. But see Dempsey, supra note 54, at 107 (“prices rose following taxi deregu-
lation in every documented case.”). 
97  E.g., Department of For-Hire Vehicles, supra note 64. 
98  Cf. READ, supra note 34, at 9–10. 
99  For purposes of illustration, this demonstration will assume that policy makers have cho-
sen a quantity of medallions that is lower than what would be needed to satisfy market de-
mand, leaving some riders unable to obtain rides. It is possible to set the limit above the 
market equilibrium but that would be a non-binding constraint and would have no impact on 
the market. A medallion system can only solve the problem of too many taxis on the street if 
the upper limit is set lower than the market equilibrium. 
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FIGURE 3 
Now, imagine a decrease in income—perhaps due to a recession—which 
causes demand to fall from D1 to D2. An unfettered market would shift towards 
q‡ and p‡. With the medallion system in place, the market would end up at q* 
and p+, instead. Profits would fall, now represented by the black rectangle be-
tween p+ and c1, and deadweight loss would shrink, represented by the striped 
triangle between q* and q‡. If, however, price controls had also been put in 
place to protect industry profits, the combination of price and quantity re-
strictions create additional chaos. If price was set at p*, consistent with the 
market price when the medallion system was implemented, then a shift in de-
mand to D2 will cause the actual quantity of taxi services to fall all the way to 
q″. Profits under both price and quantity restrictions will be the dark gray rec-
tangle between p* and c2, the cost of producing taxi services at that output level. 
Profits are higher in this scenario than if price were allowed to fluctuate, alt-
hough a significant decrease in quantity might mean that some drivers have ex-
ited the industry, so it is not an unequivocal improvement for drivers. More im-
portantly, the deadweight loss under both price and quantity controls 
(represented by the lightly shaded triangle between q″ and q‡) is dramatically 
higher than under quantity controls, alone, so society pays a heavy cost for the 
extra regulations. 
In other words, if the goal is merely to reduce negative externalities, quan-
tity control mechanisms would be sufficient, if imperfect.100 Adding a price 
control mechanism that serves no purpose but to preserve or increase monopoly 
rents reveals the likely goal of the set of regulations, and that consumer protec-
tion and societal welfare were not it. Even taxi drivers suffer in this scenario, as 
q″ is significantly lower than q*, the number of medallions outstanding. In other 
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words, there are too few potential riders for all medallions to be effectively 
used. 
While the details differ between municipalities, the point-to-point transpor-
tation market exhibited the same basic dynamics in most major cities for almost 
a century.101 High barriers to entry kept the total number of taxis down, and cit-
ies mandated a specific fare schedule.102 Taxi consumers paid higher prices for 
transportation from providers who faced minimal incentives to provide high 
quality service. Rising deadweight losses manifested in many consumers who 
simply could not obtain taxi services and taxi drivers who couldn’t make a liv-
ing. What was the purpose of all this suffering and consumer exploitation? Pro-
tection of the pool of monopoly rents. 
III. OF GALBRAITHIAN BAPTISTS AND TULLOCKIAN BOOTLEGGERS 
For decades, the benefits to consumers of a free market in point-to-point 
transportation took a back seat to protection of entrenched interests. In many 
cases, the taxi industry was largely in charge of taxi regulations, by way of taxi 
commissions that exercised tremendous power.103 One extreme example is the 
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) which, according to its 
website, has a nine-member board and approximately 600 employees assigned 
to various divisions and bureaus throughout city government.104 Eight of the 
nine board members receive no salary,105 but the ninth—the chair—does and is 
 
101  See HARA ASSOCS., INC., supra note 59, at 17. 
102  Id. at 5, 10. 
103  In addition to the powerful New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, discussed 
infra, other cities have seen their taxi commissions—ostensibly public safety entities—
acting expressly against ride-sharing in order to defend taxis. E.g., Maria Bustillos, How 
L.A.’s Taxi Boss Plans to Take on Uber, NEW YORKER (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.newyo 
rker.com/business/currency/city-los-angeles-plans-make-taxis-like-uber [https://perma.cc/ 
Q2KC-SKCC]. Most major cities have had—and most still have—taxi commissions that es-
tablish the requirements for entering the industry and, in those cities with medallion or fixed-
limit systems, maintain strong barriers to competition. See, e.g., About TLC, N.Y.C. TAXI & 
LIMOUSINE COMM’N, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/about/about-tlc.page [https://perma.cc/ 
3V8D-FWK8] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020); Commissions, CITY OF L.A. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
https://ladot.lacity.org/what-we-do/about-us/commissions [https://perma.cc/8W9M-ZWS2]  
(last visited Jan. 19, 2020); Department of For-Hire Vehicles, supra note 64; Hackney Car-
riage Unit, BOS. POLICE DEP’T, https://bpdnews.com/hackney-carriage-unit [https://perma.cc 
/2FNZ-LPSB] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020); The Transportation Division, MD. PUB. SERV. 
COMM’N, https://www.psc.state.md.us/transportation/ [https://perma.cc/3N8G-YYAS] (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2020). Some states have even centralized their taxi regulations, in order to 
limit the power of localities to erect barriers to competition from ride-sharing. E.g., Trans-
portation Regulation Division, CITY OF DALL., https://dallascityhall.com/departments/avi 
ation/Pages/Transportation-For-Hire.aspx[https://perma.cc/4D8V-YYLQ] (last visited Jan. 
19, 2020). (including a state-mandated disclosure that ride-sharing companies need not apply 
to city government for a license to operate in Dallas). 
104  About TLC, supra note 103. 
105  Id. Although that would not preclude them from extracting various other benefits from 
those being regulated in return for maintaining protections against competition. 
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responsible for supervising the remaining TLC employees.106 While not an ex-
tremely large number in context of a city the size of New York City, the reach 
of the TLC is more troubling, giving it the capacity to identify threats to taxis’ 
monopoly power and defeat them, regardless of their source. 
The TLC is but one example of the special interests who stand to lose, 
should the current regime be disrupted. Ride-sharing, as a concept, poses a sig-
nificant threat to the regime, as it allows consumers to bypass the restrictive 
barriers that protect the taxi industry, obtaining transportation from other con-
sumers.107 It also allows individuals with driving skills and equipment (cars) to 
offer their driving services to consumers without having to obtain the imprima-
tur of—and pay requisite fees to—city regulatory bodies and entrenched in-
cumbents. Most interestingly, it does this by doing what Coase would have 
suggested, reducing transaction costs.108 
Figure 4 illustrates what has occurred as ride-sharing emerged as a substan-
tial substitute good to the taxi industry. Ride-sharing, having captured the atten-
tion of transportation consumers, reduces demand for taxi rides from D1 to D2. 
The reduction in demand is high enough that it has caused monopoly rents—the 
darkly shaded rectangle—to decline significantly. A decline in the pool of mo-
nopoly rents should result in a decline in the price of buying into the system by 
purchasing a medallion. That is, in fact, precisely what is apparent from medal-
lion sales data—in New York City, medallion prices declined from a high of 
$1.05 million dollars to less than $200,000 during 2013 to 2016, a period when 
TNCs were increasing in popularity.109 In Chicago, medallion prices declined 
from $350,000 to less than $100,000 during the same period.110 There is still 
some value to owning a medallion, but that value appears to be shrinking rapid-
ly, and may eventually fall to zero if left unimpeded by government interven-
 
106  Id. 
107  “Rumor has it that the concept for Uber was born one winter night during the [2008 
LeWeb tech] conference when [a] pair [of friends] w[ere] unable to get a cab.” Dan Bly-
stone, The Story of Uber, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal- 
finance/111015/story-uber.asp [https://perma.cc/8K6P-BK35] (last updated June 25, 2019). 
108  MUNGER, supra note 79, at 75–83; Brishen Rogers, The Social Cost of Uber, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 87 (2015) (“Uber’s key innovation lies in having reduced the transac-
tion costs that otherwise plague the sector . . . .”). 
109  A September 2017 foreclosure sale of 46 medallions occurred for $8.65 million, or ap-
proximately $186,000 per medallion. Raul Hernandez, A Mysterious Hedge Fund Just 
Scooped Up the Foreclosed Medallions from New York City’s ‘Taxi King’, BUS. INSIDER 
(Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/nyc-taxi-king-foreclosed-medallions-
scooped-up-by-hedge-fund-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/D6T7-DW83]. 
110  CITY OF CHI. BUS. AFFAIRS AND CONSUMER PROT., MEDALLION TRANSFER PRICES FROM 
1/1/2013 TO 12/31/2013, https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/bacp/pu 
blicvehicleinfo/medallionowners/taxicabtransferprices01022013.pdf [https://perma.cc/74D8-
TEGY] (last updated Jan. 1, 2014); CITY OF CHI. BUS. AFFAIRS AND CONSUMER PROT., 2016 
MEDALLION TRANSFER PRICES, https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts 
/bacp/publicvehicleinfo/medallionowners/2016ListMedallionTransferPrices132017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q9GB-MGZC] (last updated Jan. 13, 2017). 
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tion.111 The other notable result of a significant fall in demand with price re-
strictions in place is the size of the deadweight loss. Fortunately, in a market 
with close substitutes, at least half of the deadweight loss equation—
consumers—still have transportation. Those who have invested in the ability to 
transport others by taxi are left without the ability to make a profit off their ser-
vices, but the culprit is not TNCs. Instead, the culprit is the pricing restrictions 
imposed by the city. Without those, existing taxi drivers would be able to sell 
q‡ rides, instead of q″. 
FIGURE 4 
This change is unambiguously good for consumers, but the entrenched in-
terests suffer losses and should be expected to push back against this kind of 
disruptive innovation. And so they have, with restrictions on TNCs being 
passed by many municipal bodies.112 In some cities, those restrictions were 
 
111  See, e.g., infra Figure 5. 
112  E.g., Sandra Baker, Fort Worth Updating Vehicle-For-Hire Rules, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM (Feb. 8, 2016, 5:17 PM), https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/article59 
204168.html [https://perma.cc/7NVL-H5MG]; Aman Batheja, With New Rules, Will Uber, 
Lyft Stay in Austin?, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 17, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2015/12/17/austin-city-council-approves-new-uber-regs-uber-th/ [https://perma.cc/UDG4- 
SKJD]; Austin Berg, Chicago Passes New Rules on Uber and Lyft, ILL. POL’Y (June 22, 
2016), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/chicago-passes-new-rules-on-uber-and-lyft/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7TLE-CFYW]; William Crum, Oklahoma City Traffic Commission Approves Reg-
ulating App-Based Ride Services, OKLAHOMAN (July 22, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://oklaho 
man.com/article/5011736/oklahoma-city-traffic-commission-approves-regulating-app 
-based-ride-services [https://perma.cc/WK87-KYM4]; Drew Joseph, Uber Says Policy  
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eventually rescinded, city officers bowing to the pressure of the consuming 
public.113 In other cities, however, the restrictions remain strong, inhibiting the 
expansion of TNCs and a corresponding reduction in demand, which might 
eventually eliminate the feasibility of taxis as a form of transportation. Notice, 
however, that taxis become infeasible, not unwanted. In a free market, taxis 
would likely remain a viable alternative; only the mandated fare schedule keeps 
individual taxi drivers from making a profit. Consumers, too, would be ill-
served if taxis ceased to operate, as that would eliminate a substitute for TNCs 
and allow TNCs to exercise market power, albeit based on network effects ra-
ther than government restrictions.114 
Given the threat to the taxi regime posed by TNCs, it should not be surpris-
ing that current industry incumbents have pushed back against the advent of 
ride-sharing. The criticisms have been withering, at times, such as the President 
of a Philadelphia taxi company’s115 comparing TNCs to a terrorist organization, 
or European taxi drivers’ comparing TNCs to rampaging Vikings.116 Criticisms 
have also come from outside the industry, often from academia.117 These out-
 
552.php [https://perma.cc/Y2YZ-HNBQ] (last updated Mar. 4, 2015, 6:22 PM); Jared Mey-
er, Seattle Doesn’t Care About Part-time Ridesharing Drivers, FORBES.COM (Dec. 6, 2016, 
7:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2016/12/06/seattle-doesnt-care-about 
-part-time-ridesharing-drivers/#6472337e47b0 [https://perma.cc/9QPK-9SBX]; JC Reindl, 
Higher Taxi Rates but Fewer Shenanigans, DETROIT FREE PRESS, https://www.freep.com/ 
story/money/business/michigan/2014/10/27/taxi-regs-rewrite-detroit-uber-lyft/17963613/ 
[https://perma.cc/V2BD-R2GC] (last updated Oct. 27, 2014, 10:40 AM). But see Alex Sam-
uels, Uber, Lyft Return to Austin as Texas Gov. Abbott Signs Ride-Hailing Measure into 
Law, TEX. TRIB., https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/29/texas-gov-greg-abbott-signs 
-measure-creating-statewide-regulations-rid/ [https://perma.cc/6ESV-QNTD] (last updated 
May 29, 2017, 11:00 AM) (describing a Texas law that created statewide regulations for  
TNCs and superseded more onerous local regulations). 
113  Fort Lauderdale is such a city. While ride-sharing services are currently available at the 
Fort Lauderdale Airport, that was not always the case, with Broward County maintaining 
restrictions on Uber and other ride-sharing companies until pressured to rescind the re-
strictions. See Brittany Wallman, Uber Stops Pickups at Lauderdale Airport, Port, SOUTH 
FLA. SUN SENTINEL (June 23, 2015, 9:39 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/brow 
ard/fl-uber-broward-court-20150623-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q4R2-3TKB]. 
114  “Network effects occur, quite simply, when the value of a product increases through a 
rise in the number of people using it.” Catherine Tucker & Alexander Marthews, Social 
Networks, Advertising, and Antitrust, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1211, 1217 (2012). Network 
effects can inhibit competition by making it difficult for new market entrants to convince 
consumers to use a product with a smaller network. E.g., id. at 1218–19. 
115  Alexis Kleinman, President of Taxi Association Compares UberX to ISIS, HUFFINGTON 
POST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/uberx-isis_n_6070472 [https://perma.cc/L7XH-ZJY6] 
(last updated Oct. 30, 2014) (While speaking at a public hearing, Alex Friedman, President 
of the Pennsylvania Taxi Association said, “I try to equate this illegal operation of UberX as 
a terroristic act like ISIS invading the Middle East . . . .”). 
116  Guy Hedgecoe, Can This Man Kill Uber?, POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/tito 
-alvarez-uber-battle-ecj-decision/ [https://perma.cc/N5GP-MF8X] (last updated July 3, 2017, 
1:17 PM) (Tito Álvarez, spokesman for Élite Taxi, a European taxi cooperative argued 
“[t]hey [Uber] are illegal, they pillage countries—they have to go . . . .”). 
117  See discussion infra Section III.C.2. 
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side criticisms often have a more subtle and scholarly tone but serve the same 
end, protection of incumbent interests. The combination provides an excellent 
example of what Bruce Yandle referred to as “bootleggers and Baptists.”118 
A. Bootleggers and Baptists Basics 
Notwithstanding the strong criticisms of some in the industry and others in 
politics and academia, ride-sharing continues to be popular with the riding pub-
lic.119 The continued opposition to TNCs in many large cities—running, as it 
does, counter to the obvious will of consumers—would seem illogical without 
the insights of Yandle’s Bootlegger and Baptist theory. Yandle showed how the 
combined efforts of anti-liquor Baptists and pro-moonshine bootleggers in the 
southern United States combined to push and maintain restrictions on the sale 
of alcohol on Sunday long after prohibition-era preferences for abstinence had 
passed.120 Applying the theory more broadly, the allegorical Baptists are the 
morally persuasive advocates and the bootleggers secretly and financially sup-
port the crusade with profits, rather than morality, in mind.121 
For a Baptist, regulation is justified by a desire to correct perceived market 
failures,122 but the bootlegger sees it as an opportunity to pursue private gain 
 
118  Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REGULATION 5, 5 (1999). 
119  Tony Arevalo, 40 Fascinating Uber Statistics and Facts in 2020, CARSURANCE (Jan. 7, 
2020), https://carsurance.net/blog/uber-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/79EB-PEAA] (reporting  
that “Uber facilitates as many as 40 million rides per month in the U.S. alone.”). 
120  Yandle, supra note 118, at 5. 
121  Interestingly, while the theory has far broader application, occasionally the Baptists are 
actually Baptists and the bootleggers are actually the purveyors of alcoholic beverages. In 
Arkansas, for example, counties must go through a complicated process to permit alcohol 
sales. Those efforts are almost always opposed by a combination of local Baptist churches 
and the owners of alcohol stores that sit just across the county lines in a wet county. Jeremy 
Horpedahl, Bootleggers, Baptists, and Ballots: Spending on Alcohol Legalization Elections 
in Arkansas (working paper) (on file with author). 
122  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, Shareholder Proposals, and Engage-
ment Between Managers and Owners, 94 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 300, 311–18 (2017) (argu-
ing that the market for corporate control has ceased to function, removing essential market 
mechanisms for policing director behavior); Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Bap-
tists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 185–86 (2002) (de-
scribing the public interest theory of regulation). The term “market failure” has a reasonably 
precise definition: some circumstance that interferes with market mechanisms and precludes 
prices from adjusting to achieve efficient outcomes. See e.g., COASE, supra note 38, at 133 
(“The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as requiring corrective gov-
ernmental action is, in fact, often the result of governmental action. Such action is not neces-
sarily unwise. But there is a real danger that extensive governmental intervention in the eco-
nomic system may lead to the protection of those responsible for harmful effects being 
carried too far.”); see also HENRY N. BUTLER ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 
125–26 (3d ed. 2014). The term is used colloquially in far less precise fashion, often refer-
ring to any market outcome that does not match the speaker’s normative view of what the 
world should look like. As it turns out, those suboptimal outcomes can be the result of prior 
government action, making further government intervention unwise. See Kidd, supra note 
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outside of a market context by having the government erect barriers to entry.123 
As barriers go up, competition falters and monopoly profits rise.124 Those bar-
riers protect industry incumbents, which is why those incumbents lobby heavily 
for regulations to be imposed on competitors and themselves.125 This type of 
anti-consumer action is touted as necessary to protect consumers,126 but that 
moralizing just conceals—often barely so—the naked self-interest of those who 
position themselves to garner rents. 
Once this principle is understood, many regulations make more sense. 
Seemingly futile regulations—including those that harm consumer welfare—
persist because the goals they are designed to achieve are those of the bootleg-
ger, rather than the Baptist. In other words, the common references to the law 
of unintended consequences might be naïve, offered because the individual 
simply has not thought clearly about who the policy choice was really intended 
to benefit. 
The coalition of bootleggers and Baptists is a strong one. Separately, mon-
ey and morality are powerful tools; combined, they gain strength beyond what 
can be explained by mere summation of their efforts. Baptists bring an organi-
zational strength and an ability to use that strength publicly, filling airwaves or 
protest spaces with moral arguments—verbal or written on placards—in favor 
of government action. Bootleggers bring financial and other pressures to bear, 
including a willingness to spend in anticipation of some expected future income 
to be derived from government action.127 
Each can achieve some desired results alone, but if their interests align, 
each one reduces the marginal costs of the other. Convincing government 
agents to change policy is a costly endeavor, especially when the Baptist wish-
 
46, at 149; Kidd & Padgett, supra note 47, at 11 (arguing that the U.S. trucker shortage is the 
result of unhelpful Department of Transportation safety regulations). 
123  See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 
7 REGULATION 12, 13 (1983). 
124  See discussion supra Part II; see also Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists, Bootleggers & 
Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 348 (2016). 
125  An early example is the London weavers’ demanding and receiving specific regulatory 
mention in the Magna Carta. Yandle, supra note 123, at 12. 
126  An example can be drawn directly from the history of the legal profession. During the 
1930s, the organized bar lobbied heavily for imposition of sanctions for the unauthorized 
practice of law. See Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleg-
gers”—The Role of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts’ Inherent Powers in 
the Early Twentieth Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 103–18 (2009). Publicly, the lobbying 
efforts centered around the alleged need to protect consumers from unqualified practitioners, 
but the driving motivation was a dramatic reduction in the legal profession’s income due to 
“overcrowding of the profession and to competition from nonlawyers.” Id. at 67–68, 114–15. 
127  The bootleggers are engaged in what public choice scholars term “rent-seeking,” seeking 
to gain extra-market returns through the use of government barriers to competition. Kidd, 
supra note 8, at 168–69. Those engaged in rent-seeking will invest resources up to the 
amount they expect to gain, once the barriers are in place. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare 
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 7 W. ECON. J. 224, 229–30 (1967). 
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es to shift government policy away from public preferences.128 Material support 
from the bootlegger increases the productivity of the Baptist’s efforts.129 Simi-
larly, when rents are being sought in an area of government that is likely to at-
tract public interest or controversy, such as when regulation will run counter to 
public preferences, rent-seeking expenditures will be more productive if they 
can hide behind a morally acceptable front.130 Neither can fully achieve its 
goals without the specialized skills of the other; combined, the range of possi-
bilities increases.131 
Although an alignment of interests is essential for both groups to enjoy the 
full benefits of their collusion, their interests align procedurally far more often 
than would be expected of other political coalitions.132 This is because bootleg-
gers care little for the overall social purpose of the regulation and Baptists care 
about that aspect almost exclusively.133 Bootleggers will focus on the details of 
the regulation because that is where profits are made, and Baptists will remain 
largely unconcerned about the details.134 The bootlegger will choose, from the 
many options for achieving the Baptist’s broad goals, the route that offers the 
highest profits and trust that the Baptist’s zeal for the regulation will assure rea-
sonable enforcement.135 As a result, there are far fewer opportunities for boot-
leggers and Baptists to find themselves at cross-purposes.136 
It should be obvious that there are limits to what bootleggers and Baptists 
can achieve with their resources and moralizing. First, regulation is subject to 
increasing marginal costs and decreasing marginal benefits, and the electorate 
will eventually reject even the most convincing Baptist if the costs rise high 
enough or the benefits fall low enough. Also, money and morals are ineffective 
if the regulation cannot take a form acceptable to the regulator,137 as regulators 
have their own incentives. Some of those incentives will be outcome specific, if 
 
128  E.g., Horpedahl, supra note 121 (describing the efforts of actual Baptist churches to de-
feat public referenda to reinstate alcohol sales in dry Arkansas counties, funded largely by 
alcohol retailers in neighboring counties). 
129  Because Baptists do not gain monetarily from their preferred change in policy, they can 
only invest resources currently on hand. Bootleggers, on the other hand, can invest not only 
current funds but can borrow against expected funds to be obtained once the policy is 
changed. Most Baptists, therefore, will be money-poor and their efforts are less likely to suc-
ceed. An infusion of resources from the bootlegger can vault a money-poor Baptist into con-
tention. 
130  See Yandle & Buck, supra note 122, at 188. 
131  Kidd, supra note 93, at 402–03; Yandle, supra note 123, at 14. 
132  See Yandle, supra note 118, at 6. 
133  See id. at 5–6. 
134  See id. at 5 (“It is worth noting that it is the details of a regulation that usually win the 
endorsement of bootleggers . . . .”). 
135  Id. 
136  See id. 
137  The term “regulator” here is used in its broadest sense, to include any who regulate busi-
ness. It therefore includes not only those who work for the administrative state, but also 
those in the legislative and judicial branches. 
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the regulator has been “captured.”138 More generally, however, regulators must 
maximize their budgets or minimize costs, subject to certain baseline goals.139 
Of course, the costs to be minimized are the regulator’s costs, not costs to con-
sumers or producers, so regulators probably want rules that are easy to enforce 
and unlikely to generate mistakes or political costs. 
Simple rules that can be generally applied most often meet these criteria. 
Regulators want fewer points where discretion must be exercised, as each point 
can lead to a disgruntled politician or powerful voter, imperiling future budg-
ets.140 Simple rules requiring uniform behavior also make compliance easier 
and violations less likely, so detection and enforcement costs will be lower. The 
influence of the Baptist allows the regulator to credibly claim that there are so-
lutions at hand,141 and the bootlegger’s attention to detail can help craft a sim-
ple rule that achieves its ends. The bootlegger also has the finances needed to 
“grease the political machinery”142 and buy off more tepid opposition. 
B. Bootleggers and Transitional Gains 
Who are the bootleggers in the ridesharing scenario? At one level, the 
question is simple—who is financially invested in the protectionist regime that 
preserves the pool of monopoly rents? Identifying bootleggers is always an im-
precise endeavor, as bootleggers are usually content to remain behind the 
scenes143—the success of their endeavors may depend on it. Some bootleggers 
have an obvious link to the industry being protected by government regulation 
while others require greater scrutiny to identify.144 In order to proceed methodi-
 
138  See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 90–91 (1982). Early capture theories of regulation 
were proposed by MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION 156 (1955), and GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A 
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 103 (1963). Regulatory capture is not 
just a danger from the regulated industry, because other groups can have strong interests in 
regulatory outcomes. See Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack 
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1847 (2007). 
139  See Yandle, supra note 123, at 13. 
140  See id. 
141  When the solutions fail, the complexity of the system gives the regulators cover for 
claiming good faith in attempting to solve the problem. 
142  Yandle, supra note 118, at 5. 
143  Yandle & Buck, supra note 122, at 188 (“[Baptists] take the moral high ground, while 
the bootleggers persuade politicians quietly, behind closed doors.”). Given the potential for 
political and economic backlash, it would seem foolhardy for an individual or company to 
boast about convincing regulators to enact policies that inhibit competition and allow the 
bootlegger to gain monopoly profits. 
144  For example, when scrubbers were mandated on all coal-fired power plants, it is easy to 
identify the bootleggers—the owners of high-sulfur coal deposits—whose coal gained a 
purely regulatory advantage over the owners of low-sulfur coal. Yandle, supra note 118, at 
6. Conversely, when the northern spotted owl was protected by closing off millions of acres 
of public forest, it would not have been obvious that the bootlegger was Weyerhaeuser, who 
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cally, the search for bootleggers should begin by identifying: (1) destructive 
policies that persist in a way that suggest the presence of a bootlegger,145 and 
(2) groups that benefit from the policy’s results. 
In the case of ride-sharing, there are any number of policies that create bar-
riers to entry into the market. Some are obvious, such as the medallion system 
(or other quantity restrictions) and price-control regimes. Other smaller barriers 
inhibit entry by raising fixed costs. These barriers include dress codes, drug 
testing, language proficiency rules, and fire extinguisher requirements146 or 
even more costly barriers such as high insurance premiums for part-time driv-
ers, costly background checks, and so on.147 In every case, these barriers are 
defended on consumer-protection grounds, although many bear only tangential-
ly on actual consumer safety, and all of them are substitutes for market regula-
tion, which can protect consumers without inhibiting competition.148 
As for those who benefit from these barriers and the pool of monopoly 
rents that they generate, the list begins with taxi drivers, but it does not end 
there. A helpful exercise is to imagine who would find their lives significantly 
disrupted if ride-sharing eliminated the pool of monopoly rents overnight, pos-
sibly even eliminating the taxi industry, in its entirety. More than just taxi driv-
ers, who would lose employment in the taxi industry, would be hurt. Taxi com-
panies, who have accumulated large amounts of physical capital, would find 
that capital somewhat devalued and their business model disrupted in a TNC-
dominated world. Taxi commissions, like the aforementioned New York City 
TLC, wield significant political power that would likely disappear—along with 
 
owned the adjacent private timber that became significantly more valuable because it was 
not subject to the regulations. See id. 
145  Government rarely achieves its goals in a cost-effective manner. A government program 
might fail for a host of reasons or might achieve some stated goals but in an inefficient man-
ner, so failure is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. What is most important is that 
the policy imposes costs on society to the benefit of a special interest. 
146  As an interesting contrast, the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission has 
promulgated extensive rules for TNCs, N.Y.C., N.Y., § 78-01 (2020), while Chicago re-
quires only a chauffer’s license and a car less than six years old. Brett Helling, The Complete 
Guide to Driving for Uber and Lyft in Chicago, RIDESTER (Feb. 1, 2020), 
https://www.ridester.com/drive-uber-lyft-chicago/. Houston originally had its own TNC lic 
ense and set of regulations, but the Texas government has now standardized ride-sharing 
rules across Texas. TEX., OCC. CODE § 2402.001 (2017). 
147  E.g., Sandra Baker, Uber, Lyft Win Deregulation Efforts in Fort Worth, FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM (June 28, 2016, 9:19 PM), https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/fort- 
worth/article86557452.html [https://perma.cc/QXV9-TC85] (describing elimination of the 
requirement of expensive fingerprint background checks); Berg, supra note 112 (describing 
previous Chicago rules requiring drug testing and physical exams for drivers); Ryan Poe, 5 
Things to Know About Memphis’ Proposed Ride-Sharing Rules, COM. APPEAL (Feb. 26, 
2015), http://archive.commercialappeal.com/news/government/city/5-things-to-know-about-
memphis-proposed-ride-sharing-rules-ep-956165667-324455001.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2RPG-J8Z3] (describing a requirement to collect and turn over to the city significant data 
about rides and riders). 
148  See Kidd, supra note 8, at 187–91. 
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the benefits it generates—if taxis were no longer a dominant mode of municipal 
transportation. Finally, the financial institutions who have financed a signifi-
cant portion of the debt required to afford the high cost of a medallion or other 
fixed costs of entry into the industry would find the value of that debt reduced 
to zero. Other interests might indirectly benefit from the pool of monopoly 
rents, such as companies that manufacture industry-specific equipment like taxi 
meters. Without barriers to entry into those markets, however, they would be 
unable to charge above-market rates for their products, so they are likely not 
sharing in the pool of monopoly rents. 
Each group of potential bootleggers has something to lose if TNCs crowd 
out taxis in the point-to-point transportation market. In order to determine the 
strength of the incentives to engage in bootlegging activity, those potential 
losses should be measured against the gains that they would achieve in a TNC-
heavy market. 
1. Taxi Drivers 
The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency estimates that the av-
erage number of rides per taxi declined 65 percent between 2012 and 2014, 
while ride-sharing was increasing its penetration into the market.149 In an ex-
treme case, taxi drivers could lose their livelihood if ride-sharing dominates the 
transportation market. Even in a less extreme case, however, if a medallion sys-
tem is effectively defeated by ride-sharing, wages for taxi drivers will de-
crease.150 
On the other hand, it would not be unexpected for the advent of ride-
sharing to increase the total demand for point-to-point transportation; simply 
affording consumers more choice increases consumer welfare, but other factors 
could also increase demand. Increased competition should lead to drivers being 
more courteous, especially in those cases where the transportation company us-
es consumer feedback to determine continued employment.151 Other consumer-
 
149  Megan Garber, After Uber, San Francisco Has Seen a 65% Decline in Cab Use, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/what- 
uber-is-doing-to-cabs-in-san-francisco-in-1-crazy-chart/380378/ [https://perma.cc/B7BP 
-V6ZW]. But see TIM O’REILLY, WHAT’S THE FUTURE AND WHY IT’S UP TO US 57 (2017) 
(“In the long run, Uber and Lyft are not competing with taxicab companies, but with car 
ownership. After all, if you can summon a car and driver at low cost via the touch of a button 
on your phone, why should you bother owning one at all, especially if you live in the city?”). 
150  See Joshua D. Angrist et al., Uber vs. Taxi: A Driver’s Eye View 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23891, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23891  
[https://perma.cc/L8KP-NNC2]. 
151  Consumer feedback, of course, allows all potential future customers to know the nature 
of the services provided by the driver, including the level of courtesy, presumably an ameni-
ty for most consumers. Drivers will therefore have an incentive to provide courtesy to cur-
rent riders in an attempt to attract more future riders. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 20 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1776) [hereinafter WEALTH OF NATIONS] (“It is not 
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friendly shifts might also arise from the need to attract customers, all raising the 
overall quality of the service and, ceteris paribus, increasing demand. 
Moreover, the taxi industry is kept from competing with ride-sharing by 
onerous regulations;152 remove those regulations and open the taxi industry to 
free competition, and the industry could innovate in unforeseen ways that 
would allow taxi drivers to remain competitive.153 Notwithstanding all of these 
possibilities for improvement in the market, if the taxi industry were forced to 
contract in response to competition, some or all of the displaced drivers would 
find a home in the ride-sharing sector.154 The most fundamental skills required 
of taxi drivers and drivers using TNC software are the same,155 so the human 
capital built up by taxi drivers over their years of driving would transition 
well.156 Some of them, perhaps a great many, who currently earn very low rents 
from the current regime if they do not own their own taxi or medallion,157 
might actually see an increase in their income.158 In sum, taxi drivers appear to 
 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest.”). 
152  See, e.g., James Briggs, 7 Rules Indy Taxis Follow, but Not Uber, INDYSTAR (Apr. 28, 
2017, 2:44 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/local/marion-county/2017/04/28/7- 
rules-indianapolis-taxis-dont-apply-uber-lyft/100948002/ [https://perma.cc/3SKT-763L]. 
153  Indeed, some cities have begun freeing up taxi companies to innovate. Fort Worth, Tex-
as, for one, has begun setting basic standards and allowing each taxi company to determine 
the best way to meet that standard. Other cities have been pressured to go in the opposite di-
rection. See Rachel Riley, Colorado Springs Taxi Drivers Seeking Level Playing Field with 
Ridesharing Services, GAZETTE (Mar. 19, 2017), https://gazette.com/business/colorado- 
springs-taxi-drivers-seeking-level-playing-field-with-ridesharing/article_ce496f1a-7a3c-
5019-b7b6-b9dcf05e2268.html [https://perma.cc/7JTT-YHYE] (describing taxi industry ef-
forts to impose the same burdensome regulations that taxis must abide on TNCs). 
154  This transition has likely already begun. See Thor Berger et al., Drivers of Disruption? 
Estimating the Uber Effect, 110 EUR. ECON. R. 197, 198 (2018). 
155  First and foremost, the ability to drive a car in a safe, efficient, and speedy manner is key 
for any successful for-hire transportation provider. Likewise, some measure of customer ser-
vice is required for both taxi drivers and ride-share drivers if they wish to be successful. 
Some knowledge of the streets upon which the driver is travelling is helpful, but not essen-
tial, given the availability of GPS technology to guide the driver in unknown areas. 
156  There is also certain to be some industry-specific human capital that will be wasted in a 
transition to a TNC format—the ability to operate a taxi meter, for example—but most of the 
skills necessary to drive a taxi will be the same as those required to drive their own car while 
using TNC software. 
157  There are occasional stories relating the plight of taxi drivers who, having saved all their 
pennies to buy a medallion, then see the value of the medallion degraded by the success of 
TNCs. E.g., Reihan Salam, Taxi-Driver Suicides Are a Warning, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/taxi-driver-suicides-are-a-warning/561 
926/ [https://perma.cc/B9QH-3XTC]. As a general rule, however, medallions are not typical-
ly owned by taxi drivers but by wealthy investors, taxi companies, or others with greater ac-
cess to financial capital. See Pranay Gupte, New York’s Biggest Owner of Taxi Medallions, 
N.Y. SUN (Aug. 8, 2005). 
158  Berger et al. discovered that the introduction of ride-sharing reduces the wages of taxi 
drivers but that self-employed drivers, including ride-sharing drivers, see their incomes rise. 
Berger et al., supra note 154, at 198. Angrist et al. also find that when the cost of leasing a 
medallion is high, Boston taxi drivers who choose to drive for Uber see an increase in their 
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be enjoying only a minimal share of the monopoly rents, so they have only 
weak incentives to become bootleggers in the fight to inhibit innovation and 
competition. 
2. Taxi Companies 
The second set of potential bootleggers is taxi companies that own multiple 
taxis and medallions, the value of which have declined precipitously and will 
continue to do so if TNCs are allowed to compete with taxis in the absence of 
protectionist regulations. Even in cities where the number of medallions is not 
fixed, restrictions on ride-sharing would still inhibit competition and increase 
the monopoly rents available to incumbent firms. Taxi companies almost cer-
tainly arise as a way of minimizing transaction costs and capturing economies 
of scale. Ride-sharing is an alternative—and arguably more efficient—way of 
minimizing transaction costs, so taxi companies’ profits would likely decline if 
ride-sharing were allowed to expand. Unlike taxi drivers, who are likely too 
dispersed to effectively lobby against ride-sharing, there are a relatively small 
number of taxi companies in each large city,159 allowing taxi companies to co-
ordinate their efforts to head off a disruptive potential competitor. 
As with taxi drivers, however, there may be a valuable place for taxi com-
panies in a TNC-heavy market. The economies of scale that taxi companies 
currently enjoy could still be exploited in a ride-sharing world. One possible 
analogy is the electricity market. A stable base load is needed on a constant ba-
sis to handle the majority of society’s needs, typically provided by burning 
cheap fossil fuels or using nuclear energy.160 Other energy sources can be used 
to provide “peak power,” handling the spikes in demand that occur throughout 
the day and night.161 In transportation, taxi companies might provide transpor-
 
wages. Angrist et al., supra note 150, at 29. At a more basic, intuitive level, it should be ap-
parent that individuals who have spent significant portions of their lives transporting indi-
viduals from point to point within a given city will have a greater understanding of city 
roads, traffic patterns, and even the traffic signals. That knowledge should provide former 
taxi drivers with an advantage over the average driver, allowing them to handle more fares 
per hour and, as a result, collecting higher incomes. 
159  For example, as of May 2019, there were 16 taxi companies licensed by the Nevada 
Taxicab Authority that provide services to Las Vegas, Nevada. NEVADA TAXICAB 
AUTHORITY, TAXICAB INDUSTRY STATISTICS (2019), http://taxi.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/taxi 
nvgov/content/About_Us/ALL/Statistics/May_%202019_COMBINED.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7L2T-DSCD] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020). Of those, three are consolidated into Yel-
low-Checker-Star Transportation, and four others appear to be new licensees, leaving an ef-
fective number of licensed companies at ten. See YELLOW CHECKER STAR TRANSP., 
https://www.ycstrans.com/ [https://perma.cc/G628-WRHA] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020). In Los 
Angeles, California, there are only 9 companies operating under franchise licenses in the 
city. CITY OF L.A. TAXI SERV., http://www.taxicabsla.org/ [https://perma.cc/DNK5-N4Q6] 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2020). 
160  Fred Bosselman, The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 
5 (2007). 
161  Id. at 7. 
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tation base load, giving each city sufficient transportation-for-hire options most 
of the time. Ride-sharing fills in the gaps, providing transportation options 
above and beyond what traditional taxis cannot. This is clearly so during times 
of extreme demand, where ride-sharing services implement “surge pricing” to 
draw more drivers and cars into the market to take advantage of increased 
rates.162 It is possible that ride-sharing could provide all of a city’s transporta-
tion for hire needs, but there is no large city where that scenario has been tried. 
In the end, a world in which ride-sharing dominates might simply see taxi 
companies shift their fleets to ride-sharing. It is possible that this shift has al-
ready begun, with many taxi companies using their own Uber-like apps to gain 
the convenience of ride-sharing within the taxi industry.163 If the industry were 
freed from onerous regulations and allowed to innovate, that transition might 
occur much more rapidly. This is not to say that taxi companies are not part of 
a bootlegger coalition against ride-sharing, only that their incentives are not 
strongly opposed to ride-sharing per se, but to the unfair competition an unreg-
ulated ride-sharing market poses to a highly regulated taxi industry. Of course, 
in cities with a fixed number of taxis, companies who own medallions would 
want to defend the future rents represented by those medallions and would fight 
far longer against ride-sharing. 
3. Taxi Commissions 
The third set of potential bootleggers is the industry associations that facili-
tate protectionist measures and extract some of the monopoly rents. As dis-
cussed above, the New York City TLC has employees throughout New York 
City government.164 Viewed through the lens of public choice, that fact is trou-
bling, as it gives the TLC influence throughout the government in addition to 
control over a vital part of the transportation infrastructure of the largest city in 
the United States. That level of power and the rent-seeking expenditures that 
will be directed at the TLC are not something that will be surrendered without a 
struggle. 
The most obvious way that a taxi commission can use its power is to main-
tain restrictions on the supply of taxis, which generates the pool of monopoly 
 
162  See Claire A. Hill, Repugnant Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research 
and Policy Agenda, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 994 (2017) (“Uber’s business model in-
cludes getting more drivers on the road by offering the drivers more money.”). New York 
City adopted a “surge pricing” model for its taxicabs in 2015, adding a flat $4.50 surcharge 
for all flat-rate trips between Manhattan and JFK Airport for the hours of 4:00 pm to 8:00 
pm. Taxis: Yellow Taxi Fare, , NYC311, https://portal.311.nyc.gov/article/?kanumber=KA- 
01245 [https://perma.cc/7RAQ-CN6C] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020). 
163  One of the most popular and successful taxi-hailing apps is Easy Taxi, founded in Brasil 
and based on the Cabify platform, which operates in 30 countries, providing many of the 
same features as ride-sharing apps, such as the ability to track taxis in real time. Passengers, 
EASY: UM APP DA CABIFY, http://www.easytaxi.com/br/passageiros/ [https://perma.cc/FSQ4- 
9JPD] (last visited Jan. 9, 2020). 
164  Supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
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rents.165 Those who benefit from the restrictions and resulting profits will en-
deavor to curry favor with the taxi commission, directing lobbying efforts at the 
commission. Perhaps this view is too cynical; the commission might be restrict-
ing supply for other reasons. It is plausible that the crowded streets of large cit-
ies would be even worse if taxis were unregulated, so perhaps the price of taxi 
service includes a premium for being able to transverse the city more rapidly.166 
Commissions also set rates, almost certainly higher than the price that 
would prevail in a competitive market but lower than the price that would be 
set by a monopolist.167 As TNCs gain market power, demand for taxi services 
would likely decline and the pool of monopoly rents would begin to dissipate. 
Medallion prices would then begin to fall, and the taxi commission’s power 
could be threatened. A taxi commission does not profit directly from the sale of 
medallions, but medallion prices are an indication of the available monopoly 
rents;168 a reduction in rents means lower incentives to curry favor with the 
commission that, in turn, would create pressure to reduce personnel and budget 
at the commission.169 In order to protect its rent-seeking income, the taxi com-
mission and its employees could be expected to mobilize and exert political 
pressures in opposition to ride-sharing. 
It is possible that many individuals who merely want to assure a safe and 
affordable point-to-point transportation market would find commission em-
ployment appealing. Even these individuals would face incentives to engage in 
bootlegging behavior, but their personal preferences might enable them to resist 
the temptation. However, the near certainty of rent-seeking makes it a near cer-
tainty that those with pure motives would be driven out, as those willing to ex-
 
165  Supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
166  New York City has debated implementation of a program that would make this theoreti-
cal idea into a reality, charging a tax for driving in certain areas of Manhattan. Those willing 
to incur the tax would have a less congested driving experience. See Winnie Hu, Congestion 
Pricing Falters in New York, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/03/31/nyregion/congestion-pricing-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/DVG3- 
MN7L]. 
167  E.g., Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 515, 520–21 (1985) (describing the ability of the antitrust regulator to limit a monopo-
list’s ability to freely set prices). 
168  See Jeremy Horpedahl, Ideology Uber Alles? Economics Bloggers on Uber, Lyft, and 
Other Transportation Network Companies, 12 ECON J. WATCH 360, 362 (2015) (“The fact 
that individual taxicab drivers and corporate taxicab companies are willing to pay such large 
sums for the permits is a strong indication that monopoly rents are being earned.”). 
169  See Omar Al Ubaydli, Economics 101: Right from the Start, Governments Really Have 
Not Liked Uber, NATIONAL (June 10, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/business/economics- 
101-right-from-the-start-governments-really-have-not-liked-uber-1.62851 
[https://perma.cc/A2BM-ZKDJ] (“[B]ureaucrats fear that they will always be one step be-
hind Uber and its offspring, which may in turn cause senior policymakers to simply give 
up.”). 
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tract rents would be far more likely to invest the time and resources to obtain a 
position where rent-extraction was available.170 
Taxi commissions have strong incentives to engage in bootlegging behav-
ior, and yet taxi commissions—or the personnel, at least—will likely have little 
difficulty adapting to a world where TNCs have come to dominate. Govern-
ment bureaucracies are notoriously resilient; even if there were not a single taxi 
to regulate, a commission would find some way to expand its mandate to en-
compass other areas of transportation and/or consumer protection. 
4. Financial Institutions 
The fourth and perhaps least obvious group that stands to lose with the ad-
vent of ride-sharing is comprised of financial institutions that finance the fixed 
costs of the taxi industry, primarily taxis and medallions. Given the high price 
that medallions once commanded—and still do, to a certain extent—at auction, 
it should come as no surprise that medallions are highly leveraged.171 Financial 
firms are willing to finance medallions because they represent a future stream 
of income that is “guaranteed” by the measures put in place to protect the mo-
nopoly rents by restricting supply of taxis.172 Those barriers to entry raise the 
price of a medallion, which increases monthly loan payments by medallion 
purchasers and, correspondingly, reduces their returns.173 In effect, this is a 
transfer from the owner of the medallion to the owner of the debt, who will re-
ceive the higher principle and interest payments. 
As ride-sharing enters the picture, the risk associated with holding taxi-
related debt will rise as the point-to-point transportation market becomes more 
competitive. Increased competition will drive down demand for taxi services, 
reducing the monopoly rents available to medallion owners. Those owners will 
find it more difficult to generate sufficient revenues to cover their monthly 
 
170  Basic principles of public choice economics argue that individuals seeking benefits from 
government agents will be willing to expend significant amounts, up to the value of the ben-
efits, during the seeking process. See Tullock, supra note 127, at 228. The same will be true 
for those government officials who see an opportunity to extract rents, as they will be willing 
to expend more effort and resources to achieve the position where extraction is a feasible 
option. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory 
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 105–09 (1987). 
171  See Brian M. Rosenthal, Facing Ruin, Taxi Drivers to Get $10 Million Break and Loan 
Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/ 
nyc-taxi-medallions.html [https://perma.cc/C6FA-ZVDW] (describing the loans that medal 
ion owners entered in order to buy their medallions). 
172  AJ Eschle, Tax Medallion Loans Lose Value, Burdening Financial Institutions, CLA 
(Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.claconnect.com/resources/articles/2017/taxi-medallion-loans- 
lose-value-burdening-financial-institutions. 
173  That this is true should be obvious, as loan payments are a cost that must be subtracted 
from gross revenues in calculating return on investment. Andrew Beattie, A Guide to Calcu-
lating Return on Investment, INVESTOPEDIA (July 1, 2019), https://www.investopedia. 
com/articles/basics/10/guide-to-calculating-roi.asp. 
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payments, eventually leading to default.174 Consequently, financiers will expe-
rience a greater risk of non-payment. This risk is not uncommon to financial 
institutions, as economic shifts—notably recessions—can increase the risk of 
nonpayment on car loans, home loans, and a host of commercial loans.175 Taxi-
medallion financiers face an additional risk arising from ride-sharing—the risk 
that the financed asset’s value will decline to zero. 
With most financial assets, the value of the asset and the ability of the bor-
rower to repay the loan are, at best, indirectly connected. A homeowner may 
lose her job and fail to make monthly mortgage payments, for example, but the 
bank still has the right to take possession of the home, which has a value inde-
pendent of the borrower’s monthly earnings. A financier who has financed the 
purchase of a taxi medallion will have rights to repossess the medallion, but its 
value will have declined in proportion to the reduction in the borrower’s 
monthly earnings, and the lender will realize a loss.176 If the loan is a recourse 
loan, there may be some ability to recover the shortfall from the medallion’s 
owner, but bankruptcy laws will limit that avenue of recourse.177 To the extent 
that the medallion is owned by a corporation or LLC, recovery will be limited 
to the total assets held by the entity.178 From a historical perspective,179 that 
 
174  E.g., Aamer Madhani, Once a Sure Bet, Taxi Medallions Becoming Unsellable, USA 
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/05/17/taxi-medallion-values-decline- 
uber-rideshare/27314735/ [https://perma.cc/4NK9-PNNU] (last updated May 18, 2015, 8:22  
AM) (“In New York, taxi mogul Eygeny Friedman is locked in a court battle with Citibank, 
to whom he owes some $31 million after some medallion loans matured.”); Polly Mosendz 
& Shahien Nasiripour, Taxi Medallion Prices Are Plummeting, Endangering Loans, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2017, 9:14 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01- 
30/taxi-medallion-prices-are-plummeting-endangering-loans [https://perma.cc/9W6S-FK57]  
(“According to a recent presentation prepared for Capital One Financial Corp. investors, 
some 81 percent of its $690 million in loans for taxi medallions are at risk of default.”). 
175  E.g., Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and Af-
ter a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011) (“The slowdown in the real econo-
my then feeds back into the financial system, as distressed consumers and businesses default 
on loans, worsening bank balance sheets.”). 
176  As a rough estimate, the 13,587 taxi medallions in New York City were worth, in 2013, 
as much as $17.6 billion. See, e.g., Ameena Walker, In NYC, 139 Prized Yellow Taxi Medal-
lions Will Hit the Auction Block, CURBED N.Y. (June 11, 2018, 4:16 PM), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2018/6/11/17450366/nyc-taxi-medallions-bankruptcy-auction [htt 
ps://perma.cc/KFA2-QTNF] (“The 139 medallions are part of a collection of the 13,587 li-
censed medallions that are required to operate a yellow taxi in New York City. In 2013, a 
medallion was worth as much as $1.3 million . . . .”). At more recent prices, those same me-
dallions are worth just over $2.2 billion, a reduction in value of $15.4 billion. Id. 
(“[C]ompetition from ride-hailing apps like Uber and Lyft has driven medallion prices down 
to as low as $160,000.”). There is no good estimate for how much of that $15.4 billion loss 
lenders suffered, but there is reason to suspect that it is a significant portion. That amount is 
not likely enough to seriously damage any financial institution—particularly given that the 
losses were likely spread across numerous institutions—but neither is it an insignificant 
amount. 
177  Ron Harris & Asher Meir, Non-Recourse Mortgages—A Fresh Start, 21 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 119, 126 (2013). 
178  See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9 (N.Y. 1966). 
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should offer, at best, only limited reassurance to someone trying to recoup a 
loss. 
The close relationship between medallion value and monthly stream of in-
come makes the risk born by the financier fundamentally different. Importantly, 
when much of the financing was arranged, a taxi medallion would have seemed 
like a relatively riskless investment. An individual borrower might not have 
been a sound money manager, or may have fallen on hard times, but repayment 
default would have resulted in the financier taking possession of a still-valuable 
asset, which could be immediately resold to another willing buyer, recouping 
losses. So long as the barriers to entry were maintained—an almost certain 
proposition even two decades ago—the financier incurred relatively little risk. 
As the specter of ride-sharing approached, the risk of non-payment became 
compounded with the risk of total asset loss180 in a way not easy to anticipate 
when the loan originated. Faced with this new and changed risk, financiers 
have a strong incentive to engage in bootlegging, opposing ride-sharing in or-
der to maintain the monopoly rents that could stabilize their risk. 
Figure 5 shows the data from New York City medallion transfers from 
January 2017 through September 2019.181 Two obvious trends present them-
selves. First, the average price of medallions had been falling during that time 
period, continuing the decline that had begun after the peak in 2013. Second, 
there was an increasing trend of foreclosure sales of medallions, which appears 
to drive most of the increase in total sales volume during 2018–19. If these me-
dallions were purchased anywhere near the peak, then the financial institutions 
who were forced to foreclose on the medallions would have taken a loss on 
each sale. Many more medallions in this situation—representing bad debt for 
those same financial institutions—might still remain under immediate threat of 
foreclosure. If the trend is not reversed, it could mean continued losses—
perhaps in the billions of dollars—to various financial institutions; that magni-





179  The classic case of Walkovszky v. Carlton shows how corporations that own taxi medal-
lions have traditionally been intentionally under-capitalized, in order to defeat lawsuits. See 
id. 
180  The dramatic reduction in the value of the medallions, discussed in Part II, supra and 
represented graphically in Figure 5, infra, would have increased both risks. The risk of non-
payment would rise because lower medallion prices indicate lower profits from operation of 
a taxi within the medallion system. The risk of total asset loss would need to be considered, 
as well, given that there must be at least some non-zero probability that the trend downward 
will continue if ride-sharing continues to increase in popularity. 
181  Medallion Transfer Reports, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMO. COMM’N, https://www1.nyc.gov/ 
site/tlc/businesses/medallion-transfers.page [https://perma.cc/3NS4-YW5M] (last visited  
Jan. 7, 2020) (raw data source). 
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FIGURE 5 
If financial institutions have joined the bootlegging coalition, it could ex-
plain why ride-sharing continues to face significant obstacles. The taxi industry 
has amassed significant political power in some large cities over the last centu-
ry, and entrenched political interests are very difficult to dislodge,182 but is the 
combination of taxi drivers, companies, and commissions sufficient to explain 
why ride-sharing has had success in some cities but failed in others? To be cer-
tain, cultural factors will also play a role, and there may be regional and local 
dynamics that can never be accounted for, but it is possible that financial inter-
ests are strong enough in some cities to add hidden strength to the public anti-
ride-sharing coalition. 
5. A Word on Transitional Gains 
Before identifying the Baptists to our taxi bootleggers, it is important to 
specify the nature of the pool of monopoly rents and its effect on the wealth of 
those who share it on an ongoing basis. Once the pool is created, so is a con-
centrated group who will do much to sustain it.183 That is standard public 
 
182  A. Michael Froomkin, The Empire Strikes Back, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1101, 1108 
(1998) (“Established interests that profit from a given legal regime will ordinarily be the 
ones with the most cash to spend on lobbying and other activities designed to lock in their 
advantages or to head off upstart competitors using upstart technologies.”); accord Stephen 
R. Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, Part I: Control of Cable Systems by 
Local Broadcasters, 22 STAN. L. REV. 221, 326 (1970) (“By now the Commission should 
have learned that ownership interests once entrenched are difficult, if not impossible, to dis-
lodge.”); Louis Michael Seidman, J. Skelly Wright and the Limits of Legal Liberalism, 61 
LOY. L. REV. 69, 89 (2015) (“Legal rhetoric alone cannot dislodge powerful and deeply en-
trenched interests.”). 
183  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 5–8 (1971); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 
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choice theory, but the entrenched interests might not be realizing as much 
wealth as it might initially appear. The reason is something that economist 
Gordon Tullock referred to as the transitional gains trap.184 Briefly, those who 
are granted the initial medallions receive tremendous profits, and are signifi-
cantly better off, but those who purchase the medallion in the future are likely 
to spend a significant portion of the monopoly rents to obtain the medallion, so 
that the stream of monopoly rents are, in effect, merely compensating the own-
er for the purchase price, rather than enriching the owner with new profits.185 
An inspection at any point in time would reveal medallion owners who are un-
willing to surrender the monopoly grant, but not solely because they fear losing 
an easy source of profits. Instead, they will refuse because doing so would 
mean they would not recoup the amount they spent purchasing the medal-
lion.186 
Moreover, Tullock postulated that medallion owners were not even effi-
ciently exploiting consumers.187 Consumers were harmed by the medallion sys-
tem, to be sure, but medallion holders were not able to effectively utilize their 
market power because of the inability to effectively adjust the number of me-
dallions.188 As the population of a city rises, so does the demand for taxi ser-
vices, but the medallion system does not adjust rapidly with rising popula-
tion.189 The result is that monopoly rents cannot be effectively maximized. No 
medallion owner will willingly accept a dilution of the medallion’s market val-
ue by giving out new medallions, and increasing medallion value by a fraction-
al value is nonsensical—what would it mean to be permitted to operate 1.37 
taxis?190 The number of medallions will therefore tend to increase only in 
clumsy fashion, in big increments, if at all.191 
 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 51–56 (1988); 
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 367–70 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). 
184  Gordon Tullock, The Transitional Gains Trap, 6 BELL J. ECON. 671, 671 (1975). The taxi 
medallion system was, in fact, the primary example of the transitional gains trap used by 
Tullock. Id. at 672. 
185  Id. at 672. Tullock points out that the owners of the medallions would still earn “normal 
profits,” id., an economic term that means the amount that would make them indifferent be-
tween owning a medallion and investing in the next best alternative. Kevin S. Marshall, Free 
Enterprise and the Rule of Law: The Political Economy of Executive Discretion (Efficiency 
Implications of Regulatory Enforcement Strategies), 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 235, 276–
77 (2010). 
186  Others have argued that it is never socially beneficial to deregulate, as the loss to the 
monopolist would exceed the social gain arising from the deregulation. See, e.g., Robert D. 
Tollison & Robert E. Wagner, Romance, Realism, and Economic Reform, 44 KYKLOS 57, 62 
(1991). If the amount spent on the preferential barriers are sunk, the economy may be left 
permanently worse off, and deregulation may only impose greater costs. Robert E. McCor-
mick et al., The Disinterest in Deregulation: Reply, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 564, 564 (1986). 
187  Tullock, supra note 184, at 673. 
188  See id. at 672. 
189  Id. at 673. 
190  See id. 
191  See id. 
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In light of this discussion and the fact that, for many decades, medallions 
continued to sell for extremely high prices,192 it bears asking whether the 
strongest form of the transitional gains trap theory is applicable. In other words, 
can it be true that all of the gains from owning a medallion are expended in 
purchasing the medallion? The likely answer is no, as that would make every 
purchaser indifferent to buying a medallion or spending the funds on some oth-
er endeavor. The high price of medallions can be accounted for by the existence 
of the transitional gains trap, as a seller will insist on extracting the value of the 
protected position conferred by the medallion.193 The volume of medallion 
sales, however, indicates that buyers are not indifferent to paying the purchase 
price for those medallions. Some of the affirmative interest in medallions might 
be a difference in expectations for the future, with buyers anticipating an arbi-
trage opportunity. It is also possible, however, that there is some residual bene-
fit to owning a medallion; not worth the full value of the medallion, but greater 
than just breaking even. Given the existence of a transitional gains trap, exist-
ing market participants will oppose a change in regime, in part to avoid transi-
tional losses194 and in part to preserve any additional monopoly rents.195 
Relevant to our taxonomy of taxi bootleggers, if Tullock’s theory is true, 
the only set of bootleggers who enjoy the full benefits of the pool of monopoly 
rents are the financiers. The reason why is simple. For the taxi drivers, taxi 
companies, and taxi commissions, the high cost of entry predicted by Tullock 
draws down the net value of the pool of rents. For financiers, however, the 
higher costs must be financed; even if financiers are unable to charge above 
market interest rates for these loans, the higher principle value means that fi-
nanciers were able, for decades, to realize reliable returns on much larger sums. 
Understanding transitional gains also helps explain why financiers—who have 
far greater flexibility to invest in either a taxi-dominated world or a TNC-
dominated one—would be sufficiently motivated to oppose ride-sharing inno-
vations. Not only do financiers stand to lose the entirety of their investment, but 
they have also been enjoying benefits derived from a greater portion of the pool 
of monopoly rents. 
 
192  See N.Y. CITY TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NEW YORK 
CITY COUNCIL 7–8, www1.nyc.gov/assets/tlc/downloads/pdf/annual_report03.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2ULV-AY6J]. 
193  As discussed infra Section III.B.5, even complete dissipation of the monopoly rents into 
the purchase price still benefits one group, the financiers who provide funds to purchase me-
dallions. A higher price means a higher loan balance and higher principle and interest pay-
ments. Therefore, to the extent that the strong form of Tullock’s theory is applicable, it 
strengthens the argument that financial institutions who provide loans to the taxi industry are 
the most likely to oppose diminishing barriers to entry. 
194  Tullock, supra note 184, at 673. 
195  Tullock proposes one way to escape from the transitional gains trap. In essence, we find 
those riders who would like to use a taxi, but will not at the mandated price, tax them and 
save the money to buy back and destroy all medallions. Id. at 672. That solution has no prac-
tical chance of being implemented, however. Id. 
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C. Academic Baptists? 
Consumers and potential consumers of point-to-point transportation have 
suffered for years under government price and quantity controls over taxis.196 
The advent of a technology that breaks through the barriers and introduces 
competition into a stagnant market should be greeted with cheers. There has 
been some of that, to be sure, but much of the response, particularly from the 
halls of academia, has been less laudatory.197 It is within the academy that we 
find the majority of taxi-Baptists, those who oppose ride-sharing and other in-
novations based on perceived risks to consumers, market stability, the rule of 
law, and so on. These taxi-Baptists have their allies outside of the academy, in 
legislatures and regulatory agencies, but academics have proven to be the loud-
est and most vociferous opponents of these innovations and the disruption they 
bring.198 
Opposition to new technologies is not a recent phenomenon, with fear of 
how they change our world motivating many critiques in the past.199 Innovators 
who take risks in pursuit of that change are often rewarded by consumers who 
purchase their products but are also castigated by others and accused of de-
struction, rather than creation. Of course, as Joseph Schumpeter pointed out 
more than seventy years ago, all progress comes at the expense of existing 
technologies. This “[c]reative [d]estruction”200 leaves behind those goods and 
 
196  Supra Part II. 
197  One example—that doesn’t bother to hide its disdain for these technological advances—
is Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1628, who refer to the sharing economy as the “taking” 
economy. They are hardly the only ones. See Kathrine T. Bartlett, Response, Sharing Sex-
ism, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1163, 1164–65 (2016); Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the 
Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1026–27 (2016); Inara Scott & Elizabeth 
Brown, Redefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 553, 
556–57 (2017); Abbey Stemler, Feedback Loop Failure: Implications for the Self-
Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 673, 675–76 (2017); Abbey 
Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for Regulating Innovation, 
67 EMORY L.J. 197, 200–01 (2017); Kellen Zale, When Everything is Small: The Regulatory 
Challenge of Scale in the Sharing Economy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 949, 956–57 (2016); 
Brett Harris, Note, Uber, Lyft, and Regulating the Sharing Economy, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
269, 270 (2017). 
198  Two important caveats must be made at this point, however. First, the claim is not that 
academia is opposed to the sharing economy—it is not—but that much of the opposition to 
the sharing economy (and certainly some of the most forceful) comes from academia, rather 
than from consumers or producers, broadly. Second, not all academics who distrust sharing 
economy technologies are severe enough in their opposition that they are worthy of the mon-
iker, Galbraithian Baptist. Infra Section III.C.2.c.ii. 
199  E.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 41 (1985) (“The enemies, 
in both cases, are advanced technology, the specialization and organization of men and pro-
cess that this requires and the resulting commitment of time and capital.”). For an extended 
treatment of the objections raised by those who are concerned about the changes the future 
brings, see VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES xv–xvi (1998). 
200  JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1943). 
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services that no longer satisfy the desires of consumers;201 specific producers 
may lose, but others gain, and every consumer benefits from improvements in 
price and quality. A careful analysis will always consider the relative benefits 
and costs of an innovation before passing judgment. Before cataloging the criti-
cisms of the taxi-Baptists, this subpart will offer a summary of the benefits that 
ride-sharing and the sharing economy offer, broadly. 
1. Benefits of Ride-Sharing 
The benefits of ride-sharing technology—and most of the sharing econo-
my, for that matter—are often misunderstood. One analysis, for example, de-
scribed the primary benefit as “help[ing] people collaborate economically at 
scale.”202 This perspective fundamentally misses the primary benefit; it is not 
the grand scale of TNCs platforms that makes the technology so useful but ra-
ther the minute scale of facilitating two complete strangers’ coordinating for 
mutual benefit.203 One random person with an available car and one random 
person in need of a ride would never, in a world without TNCs, be able to enter 
into a mutually-beneficial transaction. TNCs make that possible, and it is that 
amazing feat—individual and personal in nature, not economic collaboration 
“at scale”—that makes TNCs so beneficial. It is also essential to keep in mind 
that the benefits of ride-sharing are individual and personal in nature, in that 
they help individuals lead better lives. That the sharing economy has aggregate 
benefits should not become a distraction from the reality that it is individuals 
whose lives are improved. 
In addition to improving lives through lowering prices and improving the 
availability of transportation options,204 TNCs provide many improvements in 
quality. These benefits come in part from the nature of ride-sharing and, in part, 
as a condition of a competitive market. For example, ride-share vehicles are 
more likely to be clean and safe because drivers are more likely to take care of 
cars that they personally own.205 This is particularly the case if a driver uses 
ride-sharing as a way of affording a new vehicle for her personal use. By the 
same token, TNCs face reputational pressures that lead them to require newer 
cars, and individual drivers will receive higher ratings—allowing them to keep 
 
201  It is true that this disruption is “annoying” to those whose jobs are impacted, Calo & 
Rosenblat, supra, note 4, at 1628, but that innovation also brings tremendous benefits. 
202  Id. at 1635. 
203  It is also flawed to consider that the real “promise of the sharing economy” is based “on 
ideas of social reciprocity.” Id. at 1636. The individual who makes that little extra bit of in-
come—thereby avoiding eviction—and the individual who gets a ride to an important inter-
view—gaining the job that gives her the first step to achieving her life’s dreams—are the 
promise of ride-sharing. 
204  Supra Section III.C.1. 
205  E.g., Kathleen Elkins, A Day in the Life of an Uber, Lyft and Juno Driver Who Makes 
About $6,000 a Month in NYC, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/30/a-day-in-the-life- 
of-a-full-time-uber-lyft-and-juno-driver-in-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/BT9C-KF5V] (last  
updated Jan. 31, 2019, 12:19 PM). 
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driving—and even receive tips if they have a nicer, safer car.206 TNC drivers 
are also likely to drive more safely than taxicab drivers, both to achieve higher 
ratings and for the simple fact that the car is their personal car; getting in an ac-
cident would not only affect their work lives but all aspects of their lives. The 
rating systems provide meaningful feedback opportunities to customers, so that 
TNC customers enjoy a level of control over the services provided to them that 
does not exist in many areas of transportation outside of the sharing econo-
my.207 
The TNC business model provides other benefits to riders. Centralized 
payment is the easiest and most reliable way of ensuring that TNCs are paid for 
their facilitation services. As a result, riders can purchase a ride without carry-
ing a card or cash. This is not only an added convenience but also increases 
safety. There are many convenience benefits, as would be expected when a cus-
tomer can be instantly connected to any driver in the vicinity, rather than rely-
ing on finding a vacant taxi or arranging with a specific taxi company. Conven-
ience also extends to drivers, who can enjoy the benefits of working whenever 
is suitable for their lifestyles and schedules.208 They can choose to use ride-
 
206  Uber drivers must maintain a minimum driver rating—on a five-star scale—to avoid hav-
ing their account “deactivat[ed].” Henry Ross, Comment, Ridesharing’s House of Cards: 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc. and the Viability of Uber’s Labor Model in Washington, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 1431, 1440–41 (2015); see also Alison Griswold, Uber is Finally Making 
Riders Explain Themselves When They Rate a Driver Below Five Stars, QUARTZ (July 25, 
2017), https://qz.com/1038285/uber-will-make-riders-explain-when-they-rate-a-driver-be 
low-five-stars/ [https://perma.cc/DSM9-QMZG]. The required minimum varies by city. Ub-
er Community Guidelines, UBER https://www.uber.com/legal/community-guidelines/us-en/  
[https://perma.cc/XR9T-GFBT] (last visited Jan. 23, 2020). Uber followed Lyft’s example in 
allowing riders to tip drivers in 2017. Marco della Cava, Uber Adds Tipping Feature, Match-
ing Lyft, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/06/20/ 
uber-adds-tipping-feature-matching-lyft/103039304/ [https://perma.cc/3PWE-97UG] (last  
updated June 21, 2017, 6:58 AM). Because the safety and comfort of the car is an important 
part of the quality of the ride-share service, those who have better cars should expect to re-
ceive greater tips. 
207  While the ability to provide ex-post feedback may not initially appear to grant the rider 
control, it will after further reflection on the importance of reputational factors in the ride-
sharing industry. A driver knows that the rider can give a low rating if the ride is not satis-
factory, and a low rating will have a negative impact on the driver’s ability to continue ac-
cepting rides through the service. As a result, the driver is more disposed to accede to rea-
sonable requests by the rider than many providers of goods or services would be. See Alex 
Rosenblat et al., Discriminating Tastes: Customer Ratings as Vehicles for Bias, 
INTELLIGENCE & AUTONOMY 5–6 (2016), https://datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Discriminating_ 
Tastes_Customer_Ratings_as_Vehicles_for_Bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8A4-JYY8]. But  
see infra Section III.C.2.b. 
208  Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driv-
er-Partners in the United States 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
22843, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22843.pdf [https://perma.cc/G35G-L65U]. This 
flexibility has significant positive spillovers into other areas of drivers’ lives—increased 
flexibility in earnings opportunities means that employers particularly of part-time workers, 
must treat employees better or they will leave to operate in the sharing economy. Strangely, 
some critics of ride-sharing argue that this benefit of flexibility is part of a “utopian vision of 
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sharing as a part-time supplement to an existing job, or they can drive full time, 
each according to individual circumstances and desires.209 In doing so, drivers 
put to use what would otherwise be dead capital—a car that sits idle most of the 
week—into an income opportunity.210 The increased income that drivers obtain 
can make a tremendous difference, as it could allow them to purchase a more 
reliable vehicle, move to a safer neighborhood, afford better educational oppor-
tunities for their children, and so on.211 Driving for a TNC might also smooth 
the transition between jobs, keeping incomes higher—thereby mitigating a de-
cline in aggregate spending in the economy—and limiting the need for gov-
ernment assistance.212 
These benefits are particularly relevant to individuals who live in poorer 
neighborhoods, as well as those who live around them.213 Many of their neigh-
bors, for example, will have few transportation options, but a TNC driver who 
begins each day in the neighborhood can supplement regular income while 
providing neighbors with more convenient transportation.214 Some researchers 
 
workers who work by ‘uncoerced choice,’ ” an ideal that is fractured by the fact that some 
drivers are dependent upon the work. Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1638. The benefits 
of driving in a ride-share capacity are independent of other difficulties that the individuals 
face in their lives. They are, however, real benefits that, without the existence of ride-sharing 
technology, would not accrue to the drivers, leaving them even worse off. That those bene-
fits may not solve all other problems is hardly reason to disparage them. 
209  It may be that the greatest benefits of ride-sharing flow to members of marginalized 
groups, who may have greater difficulty making a living in more traditional employment. 
See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1642. 
210  See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 108 (2016) (“A key 
principle of the platform is putting idle capacity to work. The platform enables a more effi-
cient use of private resources.”); see also Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable 
Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 
273, 297 (2004) (describing the benefits of exploiting “excess capacity”); Christopher 
Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for 
Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. PEPP. U. SCH. L. 529, 531 (2015). 
211  See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1643 (“Supplementary income from part-
time work in the sharing economy may enable people to pay their rent, cover daily living 
expenses, or pursue their passions or goals.”); see also Cramer & Krueger, supra note 6, at 
177. 
212  Hall & Krueger, supra note 208, at 12. 
213  Tawanna R. Dillahunt & Amelia R. Malone, The Promise of the Sharing Economy 
Among Disadvantaged Communities, 2015 CHI CROSSINGS, 2285, 2293 (S. Kor.), 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702189 [https://perma.cc/57BB-8A9W]; see also Gordon  
Burtch et al., Can You Gig It?: An Empirical Examination of the Gig-Economy and Entre-
preneurial Activity, 64 MGMT SCI., 1, 23–24 (2018), available at https://doi.org/10.1287/ 
mnsc.2017.2916 [https://perma.cc/CQW7-AU28]. 
214  Or, the TNC driver who now owns a better, more reliable car, might provide transporta-
tion for neighbors in need for free, out of a desire to help. When one is further away from 
subsistence, one can indulge the more humane urges to help others. See e.g., ADAM SMITH, 
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 132 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2002) [hereinafter THEORY 
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS] (“Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely.”). 
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have concluded that the consumer surplus associated with just the UberX ser-
vice was $6.76 billion in 2015.215 
The benefits keep going. As mentioned earlier, society benefits to the ex-
tent that TNCs lower transaction costs and reduce the total number of vehicles 
on the streets.216 Success by TNCs might be enough to eliminate the need for 
public transportation,217 saving taxpayers a significant amount of money. By 
making point-to-point transportation easier and more convenient, TNCs can al-
so reduce drunk driving, fatal crashes, and crime.218 The first two reductions 
run counter to intuition that taxi drivers, who are required to possess a commer-
cial driver’s license, will be better and more conscientious drivers.219 Crime 
could be reduced through reducing the time spent waiting for transportation—
time when one is more likely to be a target of criminals.220 
The most important benefits to society from the advance of ride-sharing, 
however, are likely to come in the long run, as they change the way we think 
about car ownership.221 Recall that most cars sit idle for most of the time,222 
which leads to a different kind of car—one built to withstand the passage of 
time—rather than one built for more constant use. Cars could therefore become 
more durable. As cars are used more often, but generate income while they are 
used, the type of cars we see on the roads might be better in a variety of ways. 
 
215  Peter Cohen et al., Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber 5, 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22627, 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22627 [https://perma.cc/U5ZB-XCJ4]. The term “consumer  
surplus” is how economists describe the difference between what a consumer was willing to 
pay for a good or service and the amount the consumer actually paid. Christina Majaski, 
Consumer Surplus vs. Economic Surplus: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, https:// 
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/041715/what-difference-between-consumer-surplus-
and-economic-surplus.asp [https://perma.cc/7SJT-5W9D] (last updated Apr. 14,  
2019). Another way to think of it is that consumer surplus is the value of the other things that 
the consumer was able to buy because the good was cheaper than the maximum the consum-
er was willing to pay. See id. 
216  Rogers, supra note 108, at 90. 
217  See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1644–45 (“Some cities . . . are even experiment-
ing with subsidizing ride-hail services like Uber and Lyft to meet the cities’ transportation 
needs.”). 
218  Angela K. Dills & Sean Mulholland, Ride-Sharing, Fatal Crashes, and Crime, 84 S. 
ECON. J. 965, 988–89 (2018); Brad N. Greenwood & Sunil Wattal, Show Me the Way to Go 
Home: An Empirical Investigation of Ride-Sharing and Alcohol Related Motor Vehicle Fa-
talities, 41 MIS Q. 163, 183 (2017). 
219  Dills & Mulholland, supra note 218, at 968. 
220  Id. at 969. 
221  E.g., SHARED-USE MOBILITY CTR., SHARED MOBILITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
PUBLIC TRANSIT 5–9 (Mar. 2016), https://www.apta.com/wp-content/uploads/Resources/ 
resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/APTA-Shared-Mobility.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5TZM-XGCP]. 
222  Shannon Bouton et al., Urban Mobility at a Tipping Point, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 
2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/urban-mo 
bility-at-a-tipping-point# [https://perma.cc/QP4Y-6YQJ] (“Most cars sit idle 90 percent of 
the time or more.”). 
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As transaction costs are reduced to zero, what is now an extravagance223—a 
personal driver—would become commonplace and fewer cars would be on the 
road, but the characteristics of those cars would change for the better. 
2. What About the Costs? 
Ride-sharing is at the vanguard of the sharing economy, but all aspects of 
the sharing economy have common characteristics. Specifically, it disrupts the 
marketplace in ways that provide new and better services for consumers and 
draw new individuals into the market as producers.224 The latter effect increases 
competition and expands the stock of productive capital.225 Yet, for all these 
benefits, it has earned another nickname—the taking economy226—from those 
who believe that sharing technology has a darker side. As described by its de-
tractors, the taxi-Baptists, the dangers of the “taking economy,” generally, and 
TNCs, specifically, come in three forms: threats to riders, threats to drivers, and 
threats to society. The first category consists of ways that the TNC business 
model allegedly puts riders at risk of discrimination, as well as real risk of inju-
ry.227 The second category consists of ways that TNCs allegedly exploit the 
drivers who use their services.228 The third category consists of ways that TNCs 
exploit regulatory gaps and utilize their “deeply asymmetric information” to 
manipulate riders and drivers in ways that destabilize markets.229 
It is the third category of criticisms that merits particular concern. The first 
two categories are certainly of interest to any who might suffer harm as a rider 
or as a driver in a ride-sharing transaction. However, those transactions are vol-
untary, which should give rise to a strong presumption that the transaction was 
value enhancing for the parties that agreed to it.230 That presumption could be 
overcome by a showing of market inefficiencies—externalities, information 
asymmetries, excess market power, etc.231—but those inefficiencies are, by def-
inition, far more likely in the third category. 
 
223  One internet job site reports that the national average wage for personal drivers is $19 
per hour, at an average annual salary of $40,249. How Much Do Personal Driver Jobs Pay 
Per Hour?, ZIPRECRUITER, https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/How-Much-Does-a-Pe 
rsonal-Driver-Make-an-Hour [https://perma.cc/38VE-M8S9] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020). 
224  Supra notes 202–04, 209 and accompanying text. 
225  Supra Section III.B.4. 
226  See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1627. 
227  Infra Section III.C.2.a. 
228  Infra Section III.C.2.b. 
229  Infra Section III.C.2.c. 
230  See Paula M. Taffe, Note, Imputing the Wealth Maximization Principle to State Legisla-
tors, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 311, 313–14 (1987). 
231  Supra Section I.D. 
20 NEV. L.J. 581 
628 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:2  
a. TNCs and Riders 
When riders enter a for-hire transportation vehicle, they are, to greater or 
lesser extent, subject to the control of the driver. At the extreme end of the 
spectrum, a driver could be abusive, physically or verbally assaulting the rider. 
A driver might also be guilty of false imprisonment, refusing to let the rider ex-
it the vehicle until the rider agrees to pay more, for example. These possibilities 
exist because there is a power disparity when one individual is riding in a vehi-
cle under the control of another, particularly when the driver is a stranger. Im-
portantly, however, the risks do not just exist when the vehicle is being used in 
ride-sharing but also exist when the vehicle is a traditional cab. 
TNCs have come under criticism with allegations that their technology fa-
cilitates racial discrimination.232 To the extent anyone is subject to racial dis-
crimination, it is troubling and worthy of condemnation, and that includes a 
long history of discrimination claims against taxi companies around the coun-
try.233 When it comes to potential discrimination on the part of TNCs, it is im-
portant to point out that certain features of existing TNC-driver agreements 
limit the likelihood of discrimination. First, drivers who accept too few poten-
tial rides—or cancel too many—will be terminated, so drivers have an incen-
tive to accept all fares.234 Second, drivers are given a quality rating by every 
rider, which would disincentivize abusive behavior by drivers.235 Third, there 
would be a documented record of discrimination with a ride-sharing app that 
would not exist with taxis, and that documentation might deter some drivers 
from discriminating who might otherwise never worry about getting caught.236 
Fourth, TNC riders are typically identified only by name, so a driver would 
have to guess regarding the ethnicity or race of a rider.237 More importantly and 
 
232  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1647. 
233  See Cornell Belcher & Dee Brown, Hailing While Black—Navigating the Discriminatory 
Landscape of Transportation: Key Findings from a Survey of Chicagoans, BRILLIANT 
CORNERS RES. & STRATEGIES 1, 3 (2015), http://www.brilliant-corners.com/post/hailing- 
while-black [https://perma.cc/C9YY-ZQGT]; Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimi-
nation in Transportation Network Companies 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 22776, 2016) (collecting sources), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22776.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/KAK8-HU8H]. 
234  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1661. 
235  See id. 
236  See id. 
237  But see Ge et al., supra note 233, at 1–2 (describing experimental results where a rider 
with a “distinctively black name” waited 16 to 28 percent longer for an UberX ride request 
to be accepted). In the experiment, however, drivers did not see any information about the 
rider until after the ride was accepted, making it difficult to identify discriminatory intent on 
the part of drivers. Id. at 6. It is possible that other sharing economy providers may have 
more of a problem with this than TNCs. In the case of Airbnb, for example, the capital being 
shared is a home and people may be more insistent on knowing details about an individual 
who will be sleeping in the home than one riding in a car. As a result, it would appear more 
likely that home-sharing might facilitate discrimination better than ride-sharing. E.g., Ben-
jamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field 
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more generally, market forces discourage any form of discrimination, incentiv-
izing a pursuit of money, irrespective of the characteristics of the individual 
spending the money.238 A driver who chooses racial bias—or gender bias, or 
sexual orientation bias, or any other form of abhorrent bias—will be poorer as a 
result of fewer rides provided.239 That result will be the same, irrespective of 
whether the driver is employed by a cab company or uses a TNC app to gener-
ate rides. 
It has been alleged that other forms of discrimination are also possible un-
der a TNC business model. Given the novel structure of the enterprise, some 
critics have argued that individuals with disabilities will receive fewer accom-
modations in ride-sharing than they would under a traditional taxi model.240 
One study also found that female riders are driven farther, likely being charged 
more than males.241 Any form of discrimination is abhorrent, and traditional 
forms of transportation can be even worse,242 yet reputation factors—driver rat-
ings, for example—and market forces provide at least some incentive for racist 
drivers to keep their biases to themselves. 
Potentially more troubling are the criticisms regarding actual rider safety, 
that drivers working through TNCs are subject to less stringent background 
checks and, as a result, are more likely to commit crimes against riders.243 Taxi 
companies are, under most municipal regulations, required to conduct finger-
print background checks on all drivers,244 something TNCs rarely do.245 This 
 
Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 1–2 (2017). At any rate, that argues for fur-
ther anonymization of user profiles—something that will become increasingly more plausi-
ble as reputational scores become more robust—not against the sharing economy, generally. 
See id. at 3. 
238  See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 20–21 (2d ed. 1971); Ben 
Southwood, Markets Don’t Like Racism, ADAM SMITH INST. (Oct. 3, 2014), 
https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/liberty-justice/markets-dont-like-racism [https://perma 
.cc/B44R-C2HS]; How Free Markets Break Down Discrimination, FOUND. ECON. EDUC. 
(Apr. 1, 2008), https://fee.org/articles/how-free-markets-break-down-discrimination/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/8WRB-ZKFP]. 
239  See BECKER, supra note 238, at 20. One possible counter to this is that a racist driver 
might choose never to drive where minority riders are likely to request transportation, similar 
to the claims against cab companies being unwilling to send their cars into certain minority 
neighborhoods. It is entirely possible for a single driver to do so. However, to the extent that 
many drivers choose that path, it merely increases the opportunities for non-racist drivers to 
fill the resulting shortfall in minority-majority neighborhoods. More rides will be available, 
so a non-racist driver’s time will be more effectively used and higher profits will result. 
240  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1627 (citing THOMAS P. MURPHY, LEGAL RIGHTS OF 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES § 8.3.5 (2d ed. 2015)). 
241  Ge et al., supra note 233, at 18. 
242  See id. at 3 (“[W]e do not claim that TNC networks are ‘worse’ than the status quo.”). 
243  See, e.g., Jason Hancock, Police Pan Bill to Exempt Uber and Taxis from Local Regula-
tions at Missouri Senate Hearing, KAN. CITY STAR (Mar. 16, 2016, 10:11 AM), http:// 
www.kansascity.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article66388242.html 
[https://perma.cc/KKN3-S9N8]. 
244  Other possible safety precautions at the municipal level include mandatory vehicle in-
spection, provision of information to public officials regarding passenger names and pick-up 
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issue has received substantial media attention, particularly in cities like Austin, 
where passage of a mandate for fingerprint background checks left Uber and 
Lyft unable to operate in the city.246 
Traditional taxi background checks are far more expensive—in monetary 
and time costs247—so it might be tempting to assume that TNCs avoid them 
solely for profit. The comparison between taxi background checks and TNC 
background checks, however, is not that simple. Fingerprint background checks 
are more expensive and more burdensome, as potential drivers must find a lo-
cation to have their fingerprints taken.248 There are other disadvantages, as 
well, such as the fact that they may not be as comprehensive, due to the fact 
that local law enforcement is not required to submit records to the FBI.249 Some 
of those disadvantages are harmful to drivers, rather than to the TNCs, direct-
ly.250 For example, the background checks conducted by Uber are covered by 
state consumer protection laws, so that aspiring drivers are not rejected for a 
 
and drop off of customers, and provision of official driver records showing lack of violent 
offenses, drunk or reckless driving, and a maximum number of moving violations. See, e.g., 
Poe, supra note 147. 
245  See, e.g., Mike McPhate, Uber and Lyft End Rides in Austin to Protest Fingerprint 
Background Checks, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/technology/uber-and-lyft-stop-rides-in-austin-to-
protest-fingerprint-background-checks.html (describing how Uber and Lyft left the Austin 
market rather than conduct fingerprint background checks). 
246  Id. 
247  Fingerprint background checks take up to sixteen weeks and involve employment of FBI 
resources, with commensurate costs. Adrienne LaFrance & Rose Eveleth, Are Taxis Safer 
Than Uber?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/201 
5/03/are-taxis-safer-than-uber/386207/ [https://perma.cc/6C9G-AMHW]. 
248  An FBI background check—which will require fingerprints—costs, on average, around 
$50 plus fees. E.g., FAQs, FIELDPRINT, https://www.fieldprintusa.com/FBISubPage_Full 
Width.aspx?ChannelID=272 [https://perma.cc/D6A2-BAD2] (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) 
(“The total cost for this service is $50.00. This cost includes Livescan fingerprint collection,  
the FBI fee and access to the Report Management Portal for 30 days.”) (last visited Jan. 10, 
2020); Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L BACKGROUND CHECK, INC., https://www.nati 
onalbackgroundcheck.com/faq-background-checks.htm [https://perma.cc/4QA9-JMP2]  
(“How much does an FBI background check cost? Answer. $50/per person per request + 
shipping fees.”) (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). Potentially more difficult for lower-income 
workers is the time commitment, including finding or printing the fingerprint form and ob-
taining fingerprints at a fingerprint collection location, which may not be anywhere nearby. 
By comparison, a non-fingerprint background check can cost as little as $8 for a federal 
criminal records check, $9 for a state criminal records check, and $5 for a county criminal 
records check. How Much Does It Usually Cost to Run a Background Check?, TRUSTED 
EMPS. (June 20, 2018), https://www.trustedemployees.com/learning-center/articles-news 
/how-much-does-it-usually-cost-to-run-a-background-check/ [https://perma.cc/37YN 
ML4U]. 
249  LaFrance & Eveleth, supra note 247. 
250  Anything that keeps drivers from applying is indirectly harmful to a TNC, since the 
business model relies on a critical mass of drivers. Murat Uenlue, Business Model Canvas 
Uber, INNOVATION TACTICS (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.innovationtactics.com/business- 
model-canvas-uber/ [https://perma.cc/TA4B-SQVZ]. 
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baseless arrest251 or because of a name that matches theirs.252 A fingerprint 
background check is therefore more likely to disadvantage drivers who come 
from communities that have poor relations with the police. 
On a more foundational level, TNCs have strong market incentives to pro-
vide a safe environment for both drivers and riders. TNCs are, in effect, provid-
ing access to the transportation market to both; they make money only when 
drivers are willing to drive, and riders are willing to ride. If riders felt unsafe 
when utilizing ride-share services, that would spell the beginning of the end for 
TNCs. There are occasional crimes committed by TNC drivers against riders,253 
but they appear to be the exception, rather than the rule. Moreover, given the 
market incentives for safety and the relative lack of serious crimes being com-
mitted,254 we should withhold judgment and let market forces determine the 
appropriate level of scrutiny for aspiring TNC drivers. 
 
251  See LaFrance & Eveleth, supra note 247. (“[T]he Fair Credit Reporting Act limits the 
amount of information [Uber’s background-check company] is able to uncover[;] . . . adverse 
matters that did not result in a conviction are only reportable for seven years.”). 
252  State consumer protection laws give consumers the right to challenge false positives in 
their criminal background checks which, in at least one case, involved a consumer being de-
nied employment because an individual with the same name had been convicted of a felony, 
“even though that person shared nothing else in common . . . .” Megan Cerullo, What Every-
one Should Know About Employer Background Checks, CBS NEWS (June 28, 2019, 3:23 
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-job-candidates-should-know-about-employer- 
background-checks/ [https://perma.cc/M33P-UWC8]. 
253  E.g., Riley, supra note 153 (recounting two instances of alleged misconduct: a driver ar-
rested for attempting to break into a customer’s home after dropping the customer off at the 
airport, and a driver accused of sexual assault). 
254  Not surprisingly, the Department of Justice does not maintain a separate set of crime sta-
tistics for ride-sharing services. However, a regional transportation company in the Southeast 
(and in competition with ride-sharing companies) maintained, for the years 2013 to 2016, a 
blog cataloging “incidents” linked to Uber and Lyft. Our Blog: Reported List of Incidents 
Involving Uber and Lyft, ATCHISON TRANSP. SERVS., https://www.atchisontransport.com/ 
blog/reported-list-of-incidents-involving-uber-and-lyft/ [https://perma.cc/WNS2-RKQQ]  
(last visited Feb. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft]. From 2014 
through 2016, fifteen deaths were listed, but nine were from automotive crashes, not crimes. 
Id. The remaining 6 were from a single serial killer, but none of his crimes were committed 
as an Uber driver. John Bacon, Uber Driver Arraigned on 6 Murder Counts: What We  
Know, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/02/22/uber-driver- 
accused-killing-6-what-we-know/80725680/ [https://perma.cc/H24Y-4PBT] (last updated  
Feb. 22, 2016, 2:56 PM). Sexual assault allegations were more common, with 114 reported 
incidents. Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft, supra. While each of these events is horrifying, 
they are relatively rare, given the millions of ride-share trips every year, see Arevalo, supra 
note 119, particularly in comparison to overall crime rates in the U.S. According to the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, there were 284,350 cases of rape or sexual assault in 2014, and 
431,840 in 2015. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2015 2, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv15.pdf [https 
://perma.cc/7BKV-DVZD] (last revised Mar. 22, 2018). While that number dropped to 
298,410 in 2016, RACHEL E. MORGAN & GRACE KENA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION, 2016: REVISED tbl.1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16re.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NEY7-GM4K], the numbers are still unconscionably high. Importantly for 
the present discussion, however, is how miniscule the number of reported sexual assaults in 
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One final set of criticisms is specific to the relationship between the rider 
and the TNC, itself. These criticisms typically allege that riders are manipulat-
ed into using the TNC’s app255 or that TNCs are not properly safeguarding per-
sonal rider information.256 TNCs may have their own counter-explanations for 
the offending phenomena, but the answer to critics is actually much simpler. In 
brief, riders who feel manipulated—or who feel their privacy is violated—will 
find alternative transportation, virtually guaranteeing that TNCs will be re-
strained in their desires to manipulate or exploit. 
b. TNCs and Drivers 
TNCs have also been accused of being unfair to the drivers who use their 
apps, exploiting drivers’ relative lack of technological and legal sophistication. 
One complaint on behalf of drivers is a common one in contract law—drivers 
are not sophisticated enough to appreciate the import of all of the terms in their 
contracts—augmented by the speed at which TNCs often require drivers using 
their services to agree to modified terms.257 It is true that some drivers may not 
have a level of sophistication equal to that of those drafting the initial contract 
and the many and varied modifications, but that is not unique to TNC contracts. 
Moreover, the argument that drivers will be confused by the rapid succession of 
modifications258 ignores certain market realities that work in favor of the driv-
ers. First of all, TNCs must have drivers who agree to use the software; TNCs 
have no power to coerce any driver. Second, the world of the sharing economy 
is one of rapid informational transfer, so that what one driver knows, others 
will quickly discover, until that information is diffused throughout the pool of 
potential drivers. Third, the TNC market is highly competitive, providing com-
peting TNCs with strong incentives to discover and reveal any disadvantageous 
and unnecessary contract terms. Put together, there is simply no reason to sus-
pect that there are secret, “shadow terms”259 that drivers are not aware of, be-
cause those would be revealed by competitors and rapidly distributed to all ex-
isting and potential drivers. 
Several specific concerns raised regarding TNC technology are troubling 
as individual events but unconvincing as general critiques of the TNC model. 
 
which a ride-sharing driver is the accused is, especially spread over four years, in which the 
total number of sexual assaults would have been well over one million. 
255  See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1630 (describing reports that the Uber app shows 
multiple available cars up to the point where the rider requests a ride, after which most of the 
cars disappear and the rider is forced to wait). 
256  Id. at 1647–48. 
257  See id. at 1661. 
258  Professor Oren Bar-Gill argues that this increasing complexity is intentional, designed to 
gain an advantage over unsophisticated counter parties. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY 
CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 18–20, 141–45 
(2012). 
259  See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 608–10 (2010). 
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Uber requires drivers to wait five minutes for a rider to show up before cancel-
ling without penalty, but some drivers complain that the app underestimates the 
time spent waiting.260 Uber also requires drivers to accept a certain percentage 
of ride requests, but some drivers complain that ride requests appear too rapidly 
to accept.261 These occurrences are troubling as evidence of lingering transac-
tion costs in an industry premised on the ability to reduce or eliminate transac-
tion costs. However, they are quite limited in their frequency262 and are far 
more likely to be the result of technological glitches than intentional abuse.263 
Finally, it is possible that TNCs could facilitate racial or other forms of 
discrimination by riders against drivers.264 Riders are not typically shown any 
details about their driver prior to requesting a ride, so there is no opportunity to 
discriminate at that point, but a bigoted rider might be tempted to cancel the 
ride once more information about the driver is made available. Fortunately, 
TNCs often charge a cancellation fee,265 which would impose a monetary cost 
on that type of discriminatory behavior, but that would not curtail all forms of 
discrimination. The easiest and most obvious mode would be for a bigoted rider 
to intentionally and unfairly rate a driver lower because of the characteristic ob-
jected to by the bigot. Doing so would lower the overall rating of the driver and 
put continued employment at risk.266 
c. TNCs and Society 
Although all riders and drivers in the TNC system are subject to some costs 
and risks, those risks are frequently and loudly proclaimed by TNC opponents 
and those concerned with consumer safety. It is therefore difficult to imagine 
that a significant number of riders or drivers are unaware of those potential 
costs. As a result, riders’ and drivers’ using a TNC app reveals that the benefits 
 
260  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1631. 
261  Id. 
262  The latter complaint was categorized as “rare,” id. at 1631, and was drawn from a non-
representative sample of 400 interviews and comments on an online forum for drivers, the 
participants in which were not screened. Id. at 1628–29 n.28 (describing the data-collection 
methodology). The former complaint was categorized as being more common, but without 
any indication of frequency. See id. at 1631. 
263  Calo and Rosenblatt concede that “it can be challenging to dissect which part of the 
problem is a business practice, a technical issue, or a sociotechnical misunderstanding[,]” id. 
at 1660, but conclude that a TNC is “not necessarily absolve[d] . . . of fault under existing 
law.” Id. at 1631 n.38. While true as a technical legal matter, the market realities make it 
very difficult to imagine a company in a highly competitive and innovative market desiring 
to abuse customers in this way or succeeding in the long run, even if they were so suicidal as 
to abuse those who might provide them with revenues. 
264  See Rosenblat et al., supra note 207, at 7. 
265  E.g., Am I Charged for Cancelling?, UBER HELP, https://help.uber.com/riders/article/am- 
i-charged-for-cancelling-an-uber-ride-?nodeId=5f6415dc-dfdb-4d64-927a-66bb06bc4f82 [ht 
tps://perma.cc/BVV8-YWSS] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
266  Rosenblat et al., supra note 207, at 8. 
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of ride-sharing outweigh the costs to the individuals that participate.267 That is 
not the only consideration in any market analysis, however, as discussed su-
pra,268 certain conditions may lead to inefficient markets, leading to sub-
optimal outcomes even though market participants believe that they are making 
choices where benefits outweigh costs. 
i. Regulatory Avoidance 
The first area where the operation of TNCs might raise concerns of sub-
optimal outcomes is in the grey area between regulated and non-regulated ac-
tivity. TNCs operate within this grey area; they are not traditional point-to-
point transportation providers, but they are involved in the point-to-point trans-
portation industry. Into this grey area TNCs enter, beginning operations in a 
municipal market without jumping through the hoops that would be required of 
a new taxi driver or taxi company. Some scholars refer to this behavior as “reg-
ulatory entrepreneurship,”269 others more pejoratively as “regulatory arbi-
trage.”270 The difference between the two would appear that those in the former 
camp view TNCs as merely seizing a profitable business opportunity while 
those in the latter camp view TNCs as exploiting technical loopholes to gain a 
profit at the expense of society and individuals. In both cases, however, there is 
a presumption that ride-sharing is properly subject to regulation; TNCs enter 
the picture with the intent of flouting the law for profit and doing so can be det-
rimental. 
By entering the market without complying with important regulations, the 
story goes, TNCs are more likely to impose costs on society. Operating outside 
of a strict limit on taxis might increase congestion on city roads.271 Avoiding 
health and safety regulations might put drivers and riders—and possibly inno-
cent bystanders—at greater risk.272 Bypassing labor regulations might allow 
 
267  Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Happiness and Revealed Preferences in Evolutionary Perspec-
tive, 33 VT. L. REV. 559, 561 (2009) (“[T]he most accurate guide to what people want lies 
not in what they say, but what they do.”). 
268  Supra Section I.D. 
269  Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
383, 384–85 (2017). 
270  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1645. 
271  Congestion could increase if individuals used ride-sharing as a substitute for non-driving 
trips (mass transit, walking, biking), but could decrease if ride-sharing reduces overall car 
ownership. Lauren P. Alexander & Marta C. Gonzalez, Assessing the Impact of Real-Time 
Ridesharing on Urban Traffic Using Mobile Phone Data, (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://userpages.umbc.edu/~nroy/courses/fall2018/cmisr/papers/Real-time-Ridesharing_ 
 
Alexander.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LYU-BURF]. But see Ziru Li et al., Do Ride-Sharing Ser-
vices Affect Traffic Congestion? An Empirical Study of Uber Entry, SSRN 1, 11–13, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2838043 [https://perma.cc/5Y2A-UPM7] (last revised July 10,  
2017) (finding evidence that Uber’s entry into the market correlates with decreases in con-
gestion). 
272  See LaFrance & Eveleth, supra note 247. 
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TNCs to exploit drivers.273 In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,274 for ex-
ample, Uber drivers filed a class action lawsuit seeking a declaration that they 
were employees of Uber, rather than independent contractors—as asserted by 
Uber—so that they were entitled to protection under California labor law.275 
If the view one takes of TNCs is that they are “essentially running a taxi 
dispatch service for the smartphone age,”276 then it will be easy to draw the 
conclusion that TNCs are flouting the law. There is an alternative way to view 
the TNC business model, however, and that view changes the entire analysis. It 
is that TNCs are merely providing access to software that allows individuals to 
connect with each other, and that software has a per-use licensing fee. This sto-
ry has some weaknesses, to be sure, since TNCs impose restrictions on who is 
allowed to access their software, either as a driver or as a rider, but given the 
strong reputational component of the TNC business model, restricting access is 
fully consistent with the TNC-as-facilitator explanation. 
How one views the tendency of innovators to avoid regulations likely de-
pends on whether one views markets as largely beneficial or largely detrimental 
to human flourishing. Under the first, regulation should be imposed only when 
necessary to remedy market failures and, even then, only when government ac-
tion will not result in even greater costs.277 Under the latter, regulation should 
be imposed in order to minimize the harms—necessary though they may be—
that arise from market interactions. Antitrust laws, for example, are a form of 
regulation that inhibits aggregation of market power, and market power can be 
used to exploit consumers or to create efficiencies that can lead to lower prices 
for consumers.278 If one views markets as largely beneficial, then antitrust 
should step in only when it can be shown that consumers will be adversely af-
fected, preferably after imposing a high evidentiary burden.279 Alternatively, if 
one believes markets are largely detrimental, then antitrust authorities should 
actively police all actions that lead to increased market power. 
Most commentators, scholars, and politicians will fall somewhere between 
these two extremes, which can obscure the importance of the underlying prin-
ciples. When markets are viewed favorably, that which is not prohibited will be 
permitted. Under a regime of that sort, the innovative TNC technology and 
business model should be free to operate in any market it chooses, subject to 
the potential government regulation of its activities if those activities prove 
 
273  See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1646. 
274  O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
275  Id. at 1135. 
276  Pollman & Barry, supra note 269, at 385. 
277  See, e.g., ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 1–2 (2016). 
278  See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 559–
62 (2012). 
279  E.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 
527, 546–47 (2013) (describing the rule of reason standard). 
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harmful. When markets are viewed skeptically, however, all that is not permit-
ted will be prohibited, to a greater or lesser extent, and a TNC that enters a 
market without permission will be acting in a lawless fashion.280 
Moreover, there are many regulations that might be viewed as ineffective 
or bad policy choices281 and others that are actively harmful, not only from an 
efficiency standpoint but also from a safety standpoint.282 Removing those reg-
ulations would be beneficial to individuals, regulated entities, and society, as a 
whole, so the ultimate outcome of the change could be cheered. Indeed, one of 
the primary complaints regarding TNCs is that they are competing unfairly be-
cause they are not subject to the same regulations as taxi companies.283 If the 
regulations are not necessary for market efficiency, consumer protection, or 
safety, however, the proper action would be to remove the regulatory burden 
from taxis rather than impose the unnecessary burden on TNCs.284 The concern 
about regulatory avoidance is, at some level, a distraction because it paints reg-
ulations with a broad brush, assuming validity. A more useful and appropriate 
analysis would, instead, concern itself with specific regulations, to determine 
whether they are needed or whether they serve the interests of industry incum-
bents. 
 
280  Kidd, supra note 8, at 179–80. This path imposes significant costs on society, not least of 
which is lower innovation, as entrepreneurs are either forced into the grey market or driven 
out of the market entirely. Id. 
281  In the wake of the Enron scandal, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which, 
among other things, mandated that corporations establish independent audit committees, 
even though a consensus existed that such a mandate would have no impact. See, e.g., Sanjai 
Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 942–44 (1999) (summarizing the consensus in the litera-
ture on board independence and firm performance); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005) 
(“[I]ndependent boards do not improve performance and . . . boards with too many outsiders 
may, in fact, have a negative impact on performance.”). Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act, 
passed in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–08, contained numerous provisions that 
were known to have effectively zero chance of achieving any of the bill’s stated goals. See 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783 (2011). 
282  Bainbridge, supra note 281, at 1783, 1797–1815 (concluding that some of Dodd-Frank’s 
corporate governance provisions are likely to have adverse consequences); Kidd, supra note 
47, at 18 (concluding that federal trucking regulations, designed to increase safety by man-
dating rest periods, inevitably lead to big trucks being on the road at the busiest times of the 
day). A sizeable percentage of regulations—in addition to whatever benefits they might con-
fer on society—serve to entrench industry incumbents. Kidd, supra note 8, at 180; Kidd, su-
pra note 93, at 371, 441–43 (describing how hedge fund regulation under Dodd-Frank en-
trenches traditional financial institutions). Those incumbents not only gain additional 
monopoly rents, supra, Part II, but also have weaker incentives to consider consumer safety, 
amelioration of negative externalities, and so on, due to the lack of competitive pressures. 
283  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1626. 
284  While “misery loves company” is a popular proverb, it should not motivate public poli-
cy. 
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There is, however, something disconcerting and troubling about the pro-
cess described by TNC opponents—a company openly flaunting the rules285 in 
such a way as to generate support among the population, effectively forcing 
regulators to make a change. One might argue that this has more than a whiff of 
abusing the rule of law.286 And yet, if all that is happening is that TNCs avoid 
regulation because regulators feel compelled to follow the will of the public, 
democratic norms might support TNCs’ “entrepreneurship.” By entering a 
market that does not currently regulate their innovative business model,287 
TNCs can demonstrate that, by reducing transaction costs, the point-to-point 
transportation market can function without heavy regulation. Whether regula-
tors see the value in that argument or are merely cowed into adopting a deregu-
latory posture, the first—and most important—question is whether the market 
is functioning efficiently, sans regulation, not why regulators have chosen not 
to intervene. 
There are simply too many flaws with the regulatory-avoidance critique of 
TNCs for it to be a significant counterbalance to the benefits of ride-sharing. 
Within the critique, it is typically assumed, rather than proven, that existing 
regulations apply, in the first place, or that they are beneficial. Innovation will 
end up being broadly stifled if every innovator must abide by the regulations 
that govern what the innovation replaces. More importantly, the popularity of 
TNCs among both riders and drivers is strong evidence that the regulations do 
not provide a net benefit. Instead of banging a drum for TNCs to face archaic, 
badly designed regulations, policy makers should clear the field of those regu-
lations that have long inhibited other participants in the point-to-point transpor-
tation market, like taxis and limos. 
ii. Information Asymmetries 
Some commentators are increasingly concerned with information asymme-
tries in the age of big data, including its application to the sharing economy. 
 
285  Critics are fond of citing the “Greyball” scandal, where Uber sent images of nonexistent 
cars and drivers to certain users. Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball- 
program-evade-authorities.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/ZXL2-Z9QB].  
This practice is derided as an attempt to avoid enforcement officials, and those officials did 
receive the fake images. Id. Uber justified the practice by saying that it was attempting to foil 
individuals who were attempting to fraudulently use the app. Id. Municipal officials who are 
not looking for a ride would look suspiciously like other types of fraudulent riders, so Uber’s 
explanation is plausible. More importantly, if Uber is not properly subject to taxi regulations, 
then Uber’s efforts are nothing more than a legitimate attempt to avoid abusive tactics by 
overzealous government agents. 
286  See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1640. 
287  Importantly, Pollman and Barry define regulatory entrepreneurship in terms of whether 
there is “significant uncertainty” about whether regulations apply. Pollman & Barry, supra 
note 269, at 392. In markets where this is the case, it is unclear why the unquestioned default 
should be that the regulations do apply. 
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This “foundational critique”288 arises from the concern that big data will allow 
TNCs and other sharing economy companies to “extract[] more and more value 
from participants,”289 diminishing any value they might bring to consumers 
with their innovations. These concerns are both independent of290 and more se-
rious than those discussed supra, because they go to the heart of whether a 
point-to-point transportation market can function properly without government 
regulation. 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that this is not a traditional 
economic argument about information asymmetries, which typically take the 
form of adverse selection,291 moral hazard,292 or principal-agent problems.293 In 
each of these examples, markets break down because the price mechanism does 
not work properly when information is withheld from the market.294 In a classic 
case of adverse selection, for example, buyers of used cars do not have good 
information about the quality of cars being offered.295 Only the sellers have that 
information—therein lies the asymmetry—and buyers will discount their offer-
ing price in order to account for the probability that the car they are considering 
is a “lemon.”296 Sellers of higher-quality used cars will be unwilling to accept 
the lower price, leading to a worsening of quality in the used car market.297 
Buyers will further lower the price they offer, driving the best remaining cars 
out of the market, and so on, until only the worst cars are left.298 Again, the in-
formation asymmetry between buyers and sellers causes the market to break 
down, which is the defining characteristic of a market failure.299 
 
288  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1649. 
289  Id. at 1627–28. 
290  Id. at 1649. 
291  See Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 746 (2012) 
(“[A]dverse selection is really a problem of information asymmetry: the insured presumably 
knows more about his own riskiness than the insurer.”). 
292  See Christopher D. Dodge, Note, Doomed to Repeat: Why Sequestration and the Budget 
Control Act of 2011 are Unlikely to Solve Our Solvency Woes, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 835, 875 (2012) (“Moral hazard often arises in cases where there is an information 
asymmetry . . . as the principal cannot adequately monitor the actions of [his or her] agent.”). 
293  See Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 185, 210 (2014) (“One way to address the problem might be to adopt institutional 
reforms that ameliorate the underlying principal-agent problem, for example by reducing the 
information asymmetry between principals and agents.”). 
294  Cf. Market Failures, LIB. ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/ 
HighSchool/MarketFailures.html [https://perma.cc/69H4-6VFW] (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
295  See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970). 
296  Id. 
297  Id. at 490–91. 
298  Id. at 490. 
299  A similar situation often arises in health insurance markets, where community rating pre-
cludes consideration of all relevant characteristics of the potential insureds. A price—the 
premium—is set based on the average risk of the pool of insureds, but those with the lowest 
risk will often be unwilling to pay the premium, so the average risk will rise, premiums will 
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The type of information asymmetry that is concerning to TNC critics is 
something else, entirely. In the TNC market, riders and drivers are connected 
by TNC software, and that software has the ability to track both groups and 
gather significant amounts of data about them.300 TNC critics are concerned 
that this gives TNCs a strong informational advantage over riders and drivers, 
which could lead to exploitation.301 While certainly a legitimate potential con-
cern, this is not an argument about information asymmetry—which has a well-
understood technical meaning in economics—and it is improper to mislead 
readers in this way. 
Having said that, critics’ real arguments about exploitation of consumers 
and producers in the sharing economy deserve a fair hearing, as it is perfectly 
reasonable to argue that big businesses seek to exert market power or informa-
tional advantages to increase their profits. In addressing critics’ exploitation 
concerns, it is important to keep in mind the insights of Adam Smith, whose 
writings in 1759302 and 1776303 still hold tremendous insights about human na-
ture,304 as well as those of John Kenneth Galbraith, whose influential work, The 
Affluent Society,305 continues to fuel suspicion of capitalism and the innovation 
it generates. 
Adam Smith’s insights into human nature are the foundation of modern 
economics,306 but they are often misunderstood, even by modern economists.307 
 
rise, and more low-risk individuals will drop out. Eventually, only those with high risk will 
be left in the insurance pool. Id. at 492–94. 
300  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1652. 
301  See id. at 1651. 
302  E.g., THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 214, at xxv. 
303  WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 151. 
304  Contrary to the caricature of economic modelling offered by proponents of behavioral 
law and economics, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1650, Smith did not presume 
absolute rationality by individuals. In Theory of Moral Sentiments, for example, he proposed 
that individuals have a desire both “to be loved, [and] to be lovely,” THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS, supra note 214, at 132, which opens the door for much that would appear irra-
tional under a strict homo economicus model. E.g., Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: The 
Ethology of Homo Economicus, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 221, 223, 230 (1995). Moreover, 
his much-remarked discussion of the “invisible hand” just pointed out that selfish motives 
can yield tremendous benefits to others, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 151, at 351–52 
(“[E]very individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much 
he is promoting it. . . . [H]e is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention.”), something that is often ignored in cri-
tiques of capitalism, as if the desire for self-enrichment was inherently opposed to the wel-
fare of others. 
305  JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (3d ed., rev. 1976). 
306  Adam Smith is widely considered the “father of modern economics.” See, e.g., Ugo 
Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido Calabresi, 64 
MD. L. REV. 220, 232 (2005); Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An In-
quiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 
628 n.28 (2006); Alice M. Thomas, Re-Envisioning the Charitable Deduction to Legislate 
Compassion and Civility: Reclaiming Our Collective and Individual Humanity Through Sus-
tained Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 269, 284 (2010). 
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At the risk of gross over-simplification, Smith first argued that individuals are 
complicated, motivated by a desire not only to be thought a good person, wor-
thy of praise, but also to actually be a good person, worthy of praise.308 Only 
later, when answering the question of why some countries became wealthy 
while others struggled, did he offer the insights that have since been carica-
tured—that individuals motivated by self-interest regularly benefit those around 
them.309 In a Smithian view of the world, each individual strives to be a praise-
worthy person while they seek to meet their material needs. In a free market, 
individuals can specialize, allowing them to be praise-worthy by meeting the 
needs of others, who then provide compensation.310 
Understanding how markets function, in Smithian terms, requires under-
standing that they are merely the aggregation of millions or billions of individ-
ual transactions—in short, markets are all of us, going about the business of 
making our individual lives better.311 Some poor formulations insist that indi-
viduals need to be perfectly informed about their decisions, or that individuals 
do not make mistakes.312 Not only are these assumptions demonstrably false, 
but they are unnecessary to explain Smith’s understanding of markets. All that 
is needed is individuals’ planning for their own lives—mistakes and all—rather 
than insisting on planning on a societal level.313 As a result of voluntary trans-
actions by trillions of individuals,314 prices emerge, motivating further individ-
ual responses, as described supra.315 
 
307  E.g., infra, note 329–30 and accompanying text. 
308  THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 214, at 133 (“The most sincere praise can 
give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-
worthiness.”). Smith acknowledges that this motivation exists in greater or lesser degree in 
each individual, e.g., id. at 136 (“It is only the weakest and most superficial of mankind who 
can be much delighted with that praise which they themselves know to be altogether unmer-
ited.”), including those who seem not to be motivated by the desire “to be loved, [and] to be 
lovely,” but it is a dominant factor in many, if not all, human decisions. Id. at 132. 
309  WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 151, at 20 (“It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own interest.”). 
310  See id. at 19–23 (describing the importance of expanding markets to specialization, divi-
sion of labor, and the ability of individuals to improve their lot by “truck, barter, and ex-
change [of] one thing for another.”). 
311  See Kidd, supra note 8, at 188. 
312  E.g., F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 523 (1945) 
(critiquing the trend in economics to presume that production decisions are easily and rou-
tinely made); Padis, supra note 79, at 100 (“The argument . . . relies on the assumption of 
perfect information. The reality is that (sadly for economists) we do not live in a world of 
perfect information.”). 
313  Hayek, supra note 73, at 78–79. 
314  For a helpful example of how many decisions go into the simplest production process, 
see READ, supra note 34, at 5–7. 
315  Supra Section I.A.2. 
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In contrast, a Galbraithian view of the world sees individuals as inherently 
corruptible, easily led astray by savvy marketing schemes.316 Individuals are 
not made better by having additional things to buy but are only convinced that 
they are better off because those who have invented new things have fooled 
consumers into thinking their lives are better.317 Instead of allowing continued 
investment in consumer research or innovation, government should regulate 
with the goal of maintaining a stable consumption regime and direct all excess 
income to spending on public goods, like libraries, museums, and so on.318 The 
weakness of the Galbraithian perspective is demonstrated in the fact that The 
Affluent Society was published in 1952, and individuals and society have been 
made immeasurably better off by the advent of innovations since then.319 
Moreover, it is difficult to honestly claim that future innovations—cheap solar 
power, automated and electric cars, and quantum computing—will also fail to 
make individuals’ lives better. 
At its core, the exploitation critique offered by opponents of the sharing 
economy is Galbraithian. Take one criticism of TNCs: that they are engaged in 
“self-dealing.”320 Read in its most broad form, this is absolutely correct and al-
so perfectly unhelpful, because every market participant is engaged in meeting 
its own material needs. As described by Smith, this is a good thing because that 
self-dealing, in a market context, is possible only to the extent that TNCs meet 
the needs of consumers. To the Galbraithian critic, self-dealing is a pejorative; 
to the Smithian, it is a positive statement about the expected behavior of all 
market participants. In the context of a legal analysis, the term is likely intend-
ed to invoke negative reactions based on perceived breaches of fiduciary du-
ty,321 but this language is manipulative, since a TNC owes no fiduciary duties 
to a rider or a driver. 
 
316  See GALBRAITH, supra note 305, at 129 (“[The] central function [of modern advertising 
and salesmanship] is to create desires—to bring into being wants that previously did not ex-
ist.”), 198 (“[G]iven that consumer wants are created by the process by which they are satis-
fied—the consumer makes no such choice. He [or she] is subject to the forces of advertising 
and emulation by which production creates its own demand.”). 
317  Id. at 131 (“[I]t can no longer be assumed that welfare is greater at an all-round higher 
level of production than at a lower one. It may be the same.”), 232 (“To create the demand 
for new automobiles, we must contrive elaborate and functionless changes each year and 
then subject the consumer to ruthless psychological pressures to persuade him [or her] of 
their importance.”). 
318  See id. at 235 (“The solution is a system of taxation which automatically makes a pro 
rata share of increasing income available to public authority for public purposes.”). 
319  Galbraith offered minimal revisions to the foundational claim of the book as he revised it 
for new editions over the years. The language of the book makes clear he believed that the 
U.S. had reached peak utility in the 1950s. Less clear is whether he had revised his estima-
tion with each new edition—establishing as the new baseline for sufficient affluence at 1969, 
then 1976, then 1998—or whether he still believed that 1958 was the time when peak afflu-
ence was achieved. 
320  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1649. 
321  “Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s 
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter 
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Galbraithian thought pervades much of the critical analysis of TNCs, large-
ly based on a concern that TNCs will exploit consumers by using large amounts 
of consumer data to determine what will make riders more likely to use their 
software.322 To a Galbraithian, this sounds like exploitation of consumer gulli-
bility; to a Smithian, this sounds like a company seeking to discover and pro-
vide something that more closely matches the consumer’s exact preferences. To 
take but one example, TNC opponents worry that TNCs have discovered that 
individuals are likely willing to pay more for a ride when their phone battery is 
low.323 To a Smithian, this is hardly surprising, since modern consumers know 
that they have more transportation options as long as their phone is working; as 
the phone threatens to cease working, those options fade, and the consumer 
faces the real prospect of having no transportation, at all. How can it be surpris-
ing that a consumer, faced with that scenario, would be willing to pay a premi-
um to avoid the risk that comes from reduced transportation options? 
Critics also complain that TNCs will be able to exploit cognitive biases, 
perhaps leading to overconsumption of TNC services.324 While it is certainly 
true that each TNC would like consumers to use its software more frequently, it 
is not clear how anyone would know whether a rider is consuming too many 
TNC rides or why that would continue indefinitely. It is certainly true that some 
research has shown the existence of cognitive biases, such as believing that 
$9.99 is closer to $9.00 than to $10.00.325 But would this bias result in riders 
hiring a driver to take them somewhere they do not wish to go? More im-
portantly, a rider who pays $9.99 for a ride is still: (1) marginally better off 
than someone who paid $10.00 for a ride,326 and (2) $9.99 poorer and one ride 
richer. Over time, budget constraints are binding, pennies add up, and riders 
will learn exactly how much they can spend on ride-sharing without adversely 
impacting their other consumption choices. In the long run, even cognitive bi-
 
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 
(N.Y. 1928). Whether in a partnership or corporation, or in a trustee relationship, those with 
fiduciary duties are in a special relationship of trust and are held to a higher standard. See id. 
322  See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1654–59. Going by the name of “digital market 
manipulation,” Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1002–
03 (2014), the argument is that, by knowing so much about each user, TNCs can trick them 
into doing things they wouldn’t otherwise because they have teased out of the data patterns 
that reveal individual user idiosyncrasies. Id. Interestingly, this is not secret information 
known only to the TNC, but information that is individually available to each rider and driv-
er. The TNC does not generate this information, but merely aggregates it in a useful form. 
This aggregation is one of the primary benefits of our digital age, because we are largely un-
able to identify patterns in our own preferences but, through aggregation of our data, a TNC 
can anticipate what we will want, perhaps even better than we can. Id. at 1003. 
323  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1630. It is never described exactly how TNCs would 
be able to discern the phone’s battery level. 
324  Id. at 1628. 
325  See John D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem 
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 739–42 (1999). 
326  A penny saved is a penny earned. 
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ases will be overcome because individual budget constraints will impose a dis-
cipline stronger than biases. 
On a broader scale, critics complain that TNCs will be able to manipulate 
the market with their control over both riders and drivers.327 This concern fun-
damentally misunderstands markets, in that the market is not a machine with 
buttons and levers that can be pushed. Rather, it is effectively a complex organ-
ism that resists manipulation, except for the type of manipulation Smith envi-
sioned, providing something the individuals want to purchase so that they will 
hand over their money. Only in a Galbraithian world are individuals—riders 
and drivers—susceptible to the type of manipulation that would give TNCs any 
market power beyond what is voluntarily given them by consumers who wish 
to use their products. Coincidentally, it is precisely this type of Galbraithian 
concern over manipulation that leads to government regulation, erecting barri-
ers to entry that give incumbents market power and enabling them to do, post-
regulation, what they could not achieve in its absence.328 
In the end, Galbraithian critics of TNCs fear the future and what it might 
hold. The future is always uncertain and, therefore, inherently risky, so it is un-
derstandable that it induces fear in many people. The type of risks that bother 
TNC critics, however, are a parade of horribles, possible only in a world with-
out competition or the Smithian human desire to be lovely. One of the most 
palpable examples of this is the claim that TNCs might be able to identify when 
individuals are depressed and use it to extract greater profits.329 It is possible 
that one or more TNCs might be led by greed-obsessed individuals, and those 
individuals might have a strong desire to exploit, manipulate, and otherwise 
bleed dry TNC riders, even depressed ones. In a competitive market, however, 
it would take only one “good” company to buck the “evil” trend and loudly 
proclaim to the riding public how they were being taken advantage of by the 
other TNCs. The evil TNCs would be forever ruined, and consumer-friendly 
business practices would once again be restored. 
3. Will Regulation Help? 
Even if the parade of horribles imagined by TNC critics were realistic, it 
would still bear asking whether the proposed solutions—typically disclosure, 
disclosure, and more disclosure330—would make any meaningful difference. 
Disclosures made to consumers can have some positive impacts,331 but the gov-
 
327  See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1652. 
328  See Kidd, supra note 8, at 172. 
329  Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 4, at 1651. 
330  See, e.g., id., at 1633 (demanding more “granular” data from TNCs). 
331   As a general matter, then, product sellers have an incentive not to disclose risk-
related information that would reduce consumer estimates of the product’s net benefit. 
But why do consumers not acquire this information on their own? The reason is sim-
ple: If information were free, everyone would be perfectly informed about everything, 
making questions of disclosure irrelevant. Information about product risks, however, 
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ernment may be bad at determining what information will actually be helpful to 
users of TNC software,332 including that users may not be sophisticated enough 
to make use of the information.333 Even worse are mandates of disclosures to 
the government, which are often merely a way to increase the cost to new com-
petitors, increasing the market power of industry incumbents.334 Even if not in-
tended to serve that purpose, disclosures alone appear little more than a conces-
sion that regulators are ignorant of any real risks but believe that, given enough 
time and data, a regulatory “solution” to an as-yet-identified problem will 
emerge. At best, regulations of this sort are unnecessary costs that burden inno-
vation; at worst, they are intentional barriers to entry, designed to give current 
industry incumbents protection against competition. 
Whether the government “solution” is outright barriers to entry or indirect 
barriers through regulation, a movement away from a free market is likely to 
benefit someone. Given the market power and corresponding monopoly rents 
generated by existing taxi regulations, the incentives are strong for those groups 
that gain from the present system to engage in what public choice economists 
call “rent-seeking” to maintain the system. That is not to say that opposition to 
ride-sharing is motivated by bad faith. To the contrary, there are many who 
hold sincere beliefs that the risks of innovation in this area are too great to 
leave without regulation. However, as described herein, those concerns are 
largely hypothetical and improbable, while the benefits are real and tangible, 
making opposition counter majoritarian. 
IV. INNOVATION UBER ALLEGORY 
What can ride-sharing teach us about the sharing economy, innovation, and 
how the law should react in the face of significant disruption? As a preliminary 
matter, the entire history of the taxi industry is characterized by protectionism. 
What is more, that protectionism came about because of an apparent attempt to 
correct a perceived market failure. Whether that attempt was sincere but mis-
guided or the result of bootlegger pressures to create a pool of monopoly rents, 
it fails a Coaseian analysis because it failed to focus on transaction costs and 
their role in creating the market imperfection. Then, as now, there is much 
 
is often costly to obtain. Moreover, given the low level of risk posed by most products 
and the widespread lack of consumer knowledge about the risk, any given individual 
often will find the benefits of acquiring the information about any one product are not 
worth the costs. Thus, unless product sellers disclose risk-related information, con-
sumers are not likely to have such information available to them when they make de-
cisions about the purchase and use of products. 
Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
309, 318 (1997). 
332  One need only consider how often the small print in bank disclosures and credit card dis-
closures are actually read by consumers—almost never—to know that government mandates 
of disclosure do not mean that the information will be helpful. 
333  See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1310 (2017). 
334  E.g., Kidd, supra note 93, at 436. 
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noise about needing to do something but little attention paid to whether letting 
the technologies settle in and generate further innovation might lead to lower 
transaction costs and, eventually, elimination of the market imperfection. While 
it is impossible to know what an alternative timeline would have looked like, it 
is at least plausible that, had municipal governments withheld their regulatory 
powers, perceived imperfections in point-to-point transportation markets would 
have resolved themselves organically, obviating the need for expensive and dis-
tortionary government interventions. 
LESSON #1: PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE, EVEN WHEN REGULATING 
It is unlikely that we will ever again inhabit a world with slow, methodical 
innovation, so formal and informal rules will need to adapt to the new reality of 
accelerated innovation. Lesson #1 may be counter-intuitive, that increasing in-
novation should call for more patience—certainly our regulatory speed must 
keep pace—but making decisions based on short-term data could be disastrous. 
Rather than react out of fear of market failures, resulting in longer-lasting gov-
ernment failures, we should remember that today’s ill-conceived regulation 
could be tomorrow’s transaction cost, and adopt an attitude of regulatory hu-
mility. The remainder of this Part will identify other “life lessons” from our re-
cent history with TNCs and the taxi industry that can help lawmakers and regu-
lators protect consumers while preserving consumer choice and the market 
discipline that results. 
TNCs, like many modern innovators, do not just enter an existing market. 
Instead, they often create an entirely new one, often by reducing transaction 
costs in a way that allows entirely new connections between potential buyers 
and sellers.335 Many critics miss this important distinction and accuse innova-
tors of intentionally and wrongfully violating existing regulatory regimes by 
operating without permission. This criticism is founded upon the assumption 
that all that is not expressly permitted is prohibited, an assumption that would 
stymie innovation and limit human flourishing. This criticism also mistakes the 
very nature of innovation and does so, interestingly enough, by underestimating 
the importance of what has been accomplished. Rather than modify, innovators 
often create an entirely new thing and do so completely outside the regulated 
sphere. What the innovators have done is, of course, detrimental to entrenched 
incumbents but very beneficial to consumers, who can obtain goods and ser-
vices—transportation services in the case of TNCs—more cheaply and, given 
the increase in competition, likely with far better quality.336 
 
335  MUNGER, supra note 79, at 85–86. 
336  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY: ISSUES FACING PLATFORMS, 
PARTICIPANTS & REGULATORS 1 (Nov. 2016) (“[Firms in the sharing economy] have brought 
substantial benefits to consumers and suppliers alike, while challenging incumbents who 
have traditionally served those sectors.”), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
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LESSON #2: JUST BECAUSE IT EXISTS DOES NOT MEAN IT IS (OR SHOULD BE) 
REGULATED 
More important, from a legal standpoint, is precisely why innovators create 
entirely new areas of economic activity beyond the bounds of existing regula-
tion. In a competitive market with low barriers to entry, innovation would hap-
pen on a continuous basis, with every market participant seeking new ways of 
pleasing consumers, so as to generate higher profits. Under those market cir-
cumstances, consumers continually enjoy improvements in the goods and ser-
vices that they buy, and producers are rarely able to collect more than normal 
market profits, so consumers pay the lowest price possible. Markets that func-
tion in this way experience a smooth evolutionary process, always improving 
but rarely in a disruptive way. 
In a market with high barriers to entry, disruption is far more likely be-
cause those barriers stymie the smooth evolution brought on by continuous in-
novation. In a market with high entry barriers, innovation is largely unneces-
sary because internal competition is minimal, at best, and no external 
competition is allowed. At least, no competition is allowed using the traditional 
methods of the industry being protected. No one from the outside can develop a 
mode of transportation that looks like a taxi service, for example, because regu-
lators would easily recognize that for what it is, swoop in, and exclude the in-
novations as counter to the regulatory regime. It is only when innovation occurs 
so far outside of the regulated sphere that it may avoid the attention of regula-
tors long enough to gain a foothold and flourish. Innovation that arrives in this 
fashion will bypass existing regulations and create chaos among existing mar-
ket participants, and it is the barriers to entry that guarantee greater disruption. 
LESSON #3: HIGH ENTRY BARRIERS DELAY INNOVATION, BUT INCREASE THE LEVEL OF 
INEVITABLE DISRUPTION 
TNCs, like other innovators, also have the capacity to break through the 
transitional gains trap. Recall that the trap exists because those obtaining bene-
fits from the barriers to entry will not voluntarily relinquish their protected po-
sition, and because legislative and/or regulatory solutions are intractable. TNCs 
operate in an unregulated space and, as such, are able to begin operations out-
side the restrictions on the taxi industry. The facilitation function of TNCs 
leads to corresponding increases in both the supply of ride-share drivers and the 
demand for ride-sharing. In other words, by reducing transaction costs, TNCs 
have allowed an unregulated market for point-to-point transportation to flour-
ish. Regulators eventually caught on that there was a form of transportation not 




[https://perma.cc/Z7Y4-LU7K]; see also Koopman et al., supra note 210, at 531–32. 
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developed an affinity for ride-sharing, making regulation politically infeasible 
in most—though not all—cities.337 
LESSON #4: INNOVATION, IF NOT INHIBITED, CAN DIMINISH THE POWER OF SPECIAL 
INTERESTS 
One relevant critique of this research is that there is no evidence of boot-
leggers at work. While the theoretical foundations are solid, it is true that there 
is minimal empirical evidence to support the theory. The primary reason for 
that is the lack of reliable data on market penetration by TNCs, ideally in num-
ber of TNC drivers per capita.338 Given the constant threat of litigation faced by 
TNCs,339 it is understandable that they would be reluctant to share operational 
data like the number of Uber drivers for given cities, but that reluctance makes 
empirical work in this area very difficult. However, there is hope for the future 
of research in this area. First, even the limited existing data provides glimpses 
of possible evidence that bootleggers are active. 
For example, using a limited sample of Uber drivers available publicly,340 
it is possible to compare seventeen of the top fifty cities by population, across a 
number of variables, including Uber drivers per capita. New York City pro-
vides an intriguing case study, as compared to the larger sample. With a very 
high population density (nearly six times the average of seventeen major cit-
ies),341 the need for point-to-point transportation should be exceptionally high. 
Even with a much more elaborate subway system, New York City does have a 
higher than average number of taxis per capita, but at less than twice the aver-
 
337  A similar event occurred in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries in Cologne, where 
brewing was tightly controlled within city limits but not in the countryside, and innovation in 
the unregulated territory broke the transitional gains trap. See Diana W. Thomas, Deregula-
tion Despite Transitional Gains: The Brewers Guild of Cologne 1461, 140 PUB. CHOICE 329, 
332, 332, 336–37 (2009). 
338  It is possible that cultural factors might mean a lower level of interest in being a driver 
for hire in a particular community, but it is difficult to imagine what cultural norms might be, 
so it is reasonably safe to assume that most large cities will have equivalent numbers of for-
hire drivers using TNC technology. Moreover, controlling for the relative prevalence of taxis 
within a city should minimize this source of potential bias in the results. 
339  One legal case, filed against two of Uber’s founders, Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp, 
alleges that they should be personally liable for damages arising out of a misclassification of 
Uber drivers as independent contractors, rather than employees. Complaint at 2–3, James v. 
Kalanick, (Super. Ct. Cal., L.A. Cty. June 22, 2017) (No. BC666055). This follows another 
class action, filed against Uber Technologies, Inc., alleging harms from misclassification. 
Complaint at 2, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (No. C-13-3826 
EMC), 2015 WL 5130897. The California Labor Commissioner has already ruled that driv-
ers using Uber’s technology are employees under California law, rather than independent 
contractors. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., Case No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *4, 
*6 (Cal. Dept. Lab. Order, Decision or Award, June 3, 2015). 
340  E.g., Hall & Krueger, supra note 208, at 5–6. 
341  Data on population density was obtained from the United States Census datasets, cen-
sus.gov. Data on file with author. 
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age of these seventeen cities.342 These results would seem to indicate a signifi-
cant amount of pent-up demand for transportation services, presenting an ideal 
opportunity for TNCs, yet the number of Uber drivers per capita is less than 
one-fourth the average of the sample of large cities.343 Some of this may be that 
New York also has a significantly lower per household income, after adjusting 
for cost of living,344 so New York residents simply cannot afford to hire a TNC 
driver. However, New York also exhibits much higher influence of the finan-
cial sector on the local economy,345 so financiers might be exercising their in-
fluence to protect their investments. 
The second reason to hope is the development of proxies for TNC market 
penetration,346 which will allow greater understanding of the impacts of TNC 
operations nationally and globally. It will also allow for a more detailed analy-
sis of bootlegger activity that could, in turn, encourage greater skepticism about 
who truly benefits from regulatory barriers. 
LESSON #5: SEEK FIRST TO UNDERSTAND, THEN SEEK TO REGULATE 
This last lesson is essential to follow in a political age where every election 
is the “most important election of our lifetime.”347 There will always be a 
strong incentive for lawmakers and regulators to address problems as they 
arise, yet today’s ill-conceived regulation is tomorrow’s transaction cost, and 
crises can be used by bootleggers to motivate regulation that has not been nar-
rowly tailored to the perceived problem. More importantly, bootleggers will try 
very hard to create the perception of problems when doing so could lead to bar-
riers to entry and additional exploitation of consumers. Waiting to adopt new 
 
342  Data on taxi numbers were gathered from a variety of municipal and industry sources. 
Data on file with author. 
343  The author requested and obtained Uber data from internal Uber sources, as it was used 
to generate Figure 3 in Hall & Krueger, supra note 208, at 15, fig.3. Data on file with author. 
344  Household income data was obtained from census.gov, adjusted according to bank-
rate.com’s cost of living calculator. Data on file with author. 
345  Data was gathered from U.S. Census sources on the percentage of local jobs and local 
payrolls accounted for by various subcategories of the financial sector. Data on file with au-
thor; see also James Orr, How Important Is the Finance Sector to the New York City Econo-
my?, ECON. STUD. GROUP (June 9, 2017), https://esg.gc.cuny.edu/2017/06/09/how-
important-is-the-finance-sector-to-the-new-york-city-economy/ [https://perma.cc/79X2- 
9APR]. 
346  See Jonathan D. Hall et al., Is Uber a Substitute or Complement for Public Transit?, 108 
J. URB. ECON. 36, 38 (2018). 
347  E.g., Michael Brenes, Why 2018 May Be The Most Important Election Of Our Lifetime, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11 
/05/why-may-be-most-important-election-our-lifetime/?utm_term=.dd150bd2083f 
[https://perma.cc/3652-Q9A3] (internal quotation marks omitted); David Corn, The Most 
Important Election of Our Lives, MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec. 2018), https://www.mo 
therjones.com/politics/2018/10/the-most-important-election-of-our-lives-1/ [https:// 
perma.cc/5DVN-5KK4]; Franklin Graham, Why This Is the Most Important Election of Our 
Lifetime, DECISION MAG. (Oct. 29, 2018), https://decisionmagazine.com/why-this-is-the-
most-important-election-of-our-lifetime/ [https://perma.cc/KMY6-Q7HG]. 
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“solutions” will always be difficult for politicians, but a true concern for con-
sumer welfare requires it, especially when the perceived harms are highly spec-
ulative and remote. 
CONCLUSION 
The world we live in is changing and at an ever-increasing rate. One could 
just as easily thwart the passing of the Mississippi River as thwart the innova-
tive forces that have been unleashed on the world. Those forces come with dis-
ruption in their wake, but the ways that the law responds to innovation can min-
imize the size and duration of the harm caused by those disruptions. Choosing 
the right approach to innovation and its disruptions requires understanding in-
novation and the ways that the various affected groups will react. For example, 
it is understandable that those who benefit from the status quo will oppose any 
change that disrupts their ability to collect monopoly rents, but disruption of 
those rents is a disruption in favor of consumers, who have been exploited un-
der any regime that bestows monopoly power on any individual or group. 
A century ago, taxis changed the world as they emerged to satisfy a need 
for point-to-point transportation in increasingly population-dense cities, where 
the cost of owning a personal vehicle was skyrocketing. Today, TNCs and their 
transaction-cost-reducing technologies are changing the world in ways that dis-
rupt the established and entrenched taxi industry, and that industry is pushing 
back. A collection of taxi drivers, taxi companies, taxi commissions, and finan-
cial institutions that hold taxi-industry debt all have strong incentives to oppose 
change that threatens to diminish the monopoly rents currently being collected, 
but by doing so, they are perpetuating needless exploitation of consumers who 
have few transportation alternatives. 
Sharing economy technology not only reduces transaction costs but allows 
innovation outside of the currently regulated sphere of activity. By doing so, it 
offers a real chance to break the transitional gains trap and frees both drivers 
and riders from the grasp of the taxi monopoly. When the entrenched incum-
bents refuse to surrender their ill-gotten gains, the fight is on. Because protec-
tion of consumer-exploiting monopoly rents is hardly the foundation for a win-
ning marketing campaign, entrenched incumbents enlist assistance from 
academic Baptists, and many are willing to step forward and lend their aid. Un-
convincing arguments about consumer safety have failed to convince consum-
ers to ignore their real-life experience with the sharing economy, so opponents 
of change have adopted a Galbraithian view of human nature, cynically arguing 
that sharing economy technology and the corresponding market processes that 
accompany it will result in manipulation. This view differs dramatically from 
that of Adam Smith, who viewed individuals as social creatures, seeking the 
welfare of others as its own laudable goal, but also because it allowed individu-
als to benefit themselves. 
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This Article pushes back against the moralizing of Galbraithian Baptists 
and counsels caution before making the same mistakes that were made in the 
early days of the taxi industry. Rather than accept the impassioned pleas of the 
Baptists and hand monopoly power back to the entrenched incumbents who 
have—and will continue to—exploit consumers, lawmakers should respond to 
innovation with a Smithian faith in humanity and its ability to flourish, if al-
lowed to seek new and exciting solutions to our current problems. Lawmakers 
should also heed the warnings of Ronald Coase, that transaction costs are key, 
and that government interventions that do not reduce transaction costs will in-
evitably lead to greater stagnation. That stagnation, in turn, will only delay and 
amplify the inevitable disruption. 
